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TERRY v. OHIO AT THIRTY-FIVE: A
REVISIONIST VIEW
Lewis R. Katz'
In its landmark decision, Terry v. Ohio, 1 thirty-five years
ago, the United States Supreme Court upheld forcible
detentions (stops) and searches (frisk) on less than the Fourth
Amendment standard of probable cause. The decision came
just seven years after Mapp v. Ohio' where the Supreme
Court extended the protection of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states and demanded that police obey
the law while enforcing it." Terry represented a sudden
change in direction away from the Warren Court's focus of
protecting individual rights from police abuse of power,
evidenced in Mapp and Miranda: to empowering police and
expanding police power on the street in Terry.'
At first glance, the Terry doctrine seems to provide police
with reasonable authority to investigate suspicious activity
and prevent crimes, rather than limiting policeonly to chasing
. John C. Hutchins Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. An
earlier draft of this article was presented at the Annual Fourth Amendment
Symposium; "The Tools to Interpret the Fourth Amendment," of the National
Center for Justice and the Rule of Law, of the University of Mississippi School of
Law, on April 2. 2004. I want to thank William C. Carter and John Martin for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft and my research assistants Claire
Chau, Ryan Kerian and Shaylor Steele for their research and editorial assistance.
, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
a 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
a Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (concluding that because the Fourth Amendment's
right to privacy is enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state court) .
• Miranda v, Ar-izona, 384 U.S. 436. 467 (1966) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination includes proper procedural
safeguards against police abuse of "the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crimes").
5 See generally Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response
to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1133, 1136-37 (1998)
(discussing balancing of individual liberties with police power).
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criminals after the commission of a crime. In fact, history has
treated the Terry doctrine kindly; Professor Steven A.
Saltz burg described the decision as a "practically perfect
doctrine." While Terry has, in fact, provided police with the
necessary tools to proactively fight crime, the Terry Court
dismally failed to strike an adequate balance between effective
law enforcement and individual freedom.' The Court struck
that balance completely in favor of the police, and the balance
has been further tipped in favor of police by later Supreme
Courts.
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio, police were free in most states to
act without regard to the limitations imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. The burden of that police conduct fell most
heavily on people in inner city, minority neighborhoods. At the
time of Mapp, half the states had not imposed the
exclusionary rule as a matter of state law." In states without
an exclusionary rule, police were free to detain and search
people without reasonable cause because that police conduct
had no impact on the outcome of any resulting criminal
charges against the subject of the detention and search. Even
in states that had adopted the exclusionary rule, citizens were
exposed to arguably illegal detentions and searches under
6 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 911, 91l (1998).
7 Cf, Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v, Ohio, 34 How. L.J, 567, 576 (1991)
(arguing that the Court made the right compromise at the time but Terry's
subsequent erosion negated the Court's insight).
6 See Francis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search
and Seizure, 52 J. eRIM, L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 246 (1961).
Not all of the American states have adopted the exclusionary rule;
indeed, only about half of them have done so. Twenty of the states
appear to have adopted the rule without substantial qualification .... In
Michigan, although the exclusionary rule was adopted early by the courts,
certain categories of evidence are now placed outside the operation of the
rule by constitutional amendment, including narcotics, firearms and other
dangerous weapons seized in places other than a dwelling house.
Alabama, Maryland, and South Dakota have by legislation adopted the
rule only as to the situations stipulated in their statutes. Hawaii and
Alaska have apparently not spoken to the question since becoming states.
The federal rule of exclusion operates in the District of Columbia.
Id. at 251-52 (footnotes omitted).
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cover of suspicious persons, loitering and vagrancy statutes
and ordinances.' The movement of the states toward adoption
of the exclusionary rule on their own and the imposition of the
exclusionary rule on the remaining states in 1963, as well as
the contemporaneous challenges to loitering and vagrancy
statutes as unconstitutionally vague and overly broad,
required police to develop new theories to justify interference
on less than probable cause with a citizen's liberty and privacy
9 See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME (Niko Pfund ed., 1998).
For example, vagrancy laws allowed Blacks to be arrested for the "crime"
of being unemployed. Mississippi's statute was representative:
[Alll freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes . . . over the age of
eighteen years, found on the second Monday in January, 1866, or
thereafter with no lawful employment or business, or found
unlawfully assembling themselves together., . shall be deemed
vagrants, and on conviction thereof, shall be fined _ not
exceeding fifty dollars . and imprisoned , . . not exceeding ten
days.
ld. at 19-20 (quoting Jason Gillmer, U.S. v. Clary: Equal Protection and the Crack
Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 538 (1995) (citing an Act to Amend the Vagrant
Laws of the State); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy· Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
Administratively. vagrancy-type statutes are regarded as essential criminal
preventives, providing a residual police power to facilitate the arrest,
investigation and incarceration of suspicious persons. When the District of
Columbia vagrancy law was revised ten years ago, Congress was told by
police officials ".. that one of the principal needs to assi.st in correcting
the existing criminal situation in the District of Columbia is the
strengthening of the existing vagrancy law." In most jurisdictions these
statutes are sufficiently indefinite to give the police wide scope. They
permit arrest without warrant and summary prosecution without jury
before a justice of the peace or magistrate, and often simplify the problem
of proof by placing on the defendant the burden of at least going forward
with evidence of innocence. To the extent that one police actually are
hampered by the restrictions of the ordinary law of arrest, by the
illegality of arrests on mere suspicion alone, and by the defects and
loopholes of substantive criminal law, vagrancy-type statutes facilitate the
apprehension) investigation or harassment of suspected criminals. When
suspects can be arrested for nothing else, it is often possible to "go and
vag them.
ld. at 714 (footnotes omitted); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and
Race, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 151 (2000). See generally William O.
Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 12-14 (1960);
Comment, Is There Something Suspicious About the Constitutionality of Loitering
Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717 (989).
425
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interests on the street."
A 1959 District of Columbia case, United States v.
Mitchell, II illustrates the issue. While walking his beat, a
police officer noticed the defendant attempting to flag a taxi
cab at 5:30 in the morning." The man was carrying a
pillowcase, and from it an electric cord was dangling onto the
ground." The officer approached the defendant and asked
him where he was coming from and what his name was."
The defendant stated his name and told the officer that he
was coming from a party." The defendant also provided
identification which corroborated his oral identification." The
officer had been walking the beat all night and had not seen
or heard evidence of a party." At this point in time, the
officer had not observed a crime, nor had he received a report
of a crime." However, the officer asked the defendant to
accompany him to a police call box roughly a block away."
When the defendant (wisely) inquired whether he was under
" See Papechristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
This ordinance is void-for-vagueness, both in the case that it "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute," and because it encourages arbitrary
and erratic arrests and convictions ... , The poor among us, the
minorities, the average householder are not in business and not alerted to
the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have
no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them . .
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance -
poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers-may be required to
comport themselves according to the life style deemed appropriate by the
Jacksonville police and the courts.
Popochristou, 405 U.S. at 162-63, 170 (citations omitted); see also Chicago v,
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating a city ordinance that prohibited "criminal
street gang members from loitering with one another or with other persons in any
public place" for being impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction
on personal liberties).
n 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959).
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arrest, the officer replied, "No,you are just being detained.""
Upon arrival at the call box "the defendant seated himself on
the record player contained in the [pillowcase],"and the officer
made the call to the police station." The police dispatch
informed the officer that no house breakings had been
reported." Suddenly, the defendant fled leaving the property
behind, and a short time later a report of a house burglary
was received by police!' One week later, the defendant was
apprehended and charged with house breaking and larceny of
the record player and records contained in the pillow case that
he had left when he bolted."
Mitchell was tried in the District of Columbia where the
federal exclusionary rule, adopted in 1914, applied." The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence. Counsel for both
the government and the state agreed that the mere
questioning of the defendant did not constitute an arrest."
However, the defense asserted that an arrest occurred when
the defendant was asked to accompany the officer to the call
box." The district court agreed, suppressed the evidence and
held that the defendant had been seized without probable
cause when he was required to accompany the officer to the
call box." At the time, federal law did not authorize the legal
detention of a suspect on less than probable cause.
After Mapp dictated the same result as Mitchell in all of
the states, pressure arose to allow police to make
investigatory stops on less than probable cause as they had
done for generations in this country. The United States






" See Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (holding that
evidence which is obtained by federal officials as a result of unlawful searches
and seizures cannot be used to convict accused persons because it violates the
Fourth Amendment).
as Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. at 636.
27 [d.
ea [d. at 637-38.
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that the practice was commonand indicating an intent to
harness the practice within the reasonableness standard of
the Fourth Amendment.'"
In this Article, I suggest that, while the Warren Court
29 See David A Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659-60 (1994).
For the first time, the Court allowed a criminal search and seizure
without probable cause. From Terry forward, the question would not be
whether there was probable cause, but whether there was reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The Court based this change on
a balancing of interests. On the one hand, law enforcement called for
supple new tools to respond to crime and the dangers its perpetrators
posed to officers; on the other, the Court thought the loss of individual
liberty was not too great, since Terry only allowed a brief stop and a
limited, pat-down search of outer clothing to fmd weapons.
[d. at 659-60 (footnotes omitted); see oleo Brian D. Walsh, Illinois u. Wardlow:
High-Crime Areas, Flight, and the Fourth Amendment, 54 ARK. L. REV. 879 (2002).
Before Terry u. Ohio, the seizure of an individual required probable
cause to arrest. Terry was the first case in which the Court was squarely
faced with the question of "whether it is always unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for
weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest." Terry and its
progeny ultimately recognized a narrow exception to the rule requiring an
officer to have probable cause for arrest prior to a search or seizure. The
limited scope of the search and seizure associated with these brief
investigative encounters between law enforcement and suspect, as
compared to an arrest, allowed the Court to make such an exception.
[d. at 890-91 (footnotes omitted).
For a discussion of how Terry also caused confusion about the meaning of
arrest, see Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of
the Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129 (2003).
The Supreme Court in Terry and its progeny brought within the
coverage of the Amendment much of what the common law labeled
"accostings" and pushed the time of arrest back, requiring a detention
exceeding the dimensions of permissible stop. Terry significantly departed
from the common law's dismissal of some intrusions as accostings by
incorporating "stops" within the Amendment but roughly followed the
common law, and arguably the Framers' intent, by distinguishing between
minor intrusions and arrests. Accepting as a settled principle Terry's
expansion of the Fourth Amendment to include stops within its coverage
and attempting to reconcile the common law and the Framers' intent at
a level of particularity, with those principles, it should be concluded that
an arrest is a detention that requires something more than an accosting,
that is, something akin to a detention exceeding the bounds of a Terry
stop.
[d. at 192 (footnotes omitted).
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provided a needed tool to police, it failed to achieve its stated
purpose of tying the practice to the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard. First, the Court failed to adequately
define an "investigatory stop," leading later courts to harden
the definition, eliminating the Fourth Amendment from most
on-the-street police-citizen encounters. Second, the facts in
Terry failed to meet the reasonableness standard Chief Justice
Warren purported to apply and which subsequently has been
further weakened in later cases. Finally, the decision in Terry
failed to strike a meaningful Fourth Amendment balance
between effective law enforcement and individual freedom.
Part I of this Article closely examines the stop in Terry
(which the Warren Court did not do). Part II examines the
late 1960swhich provided the context for the Supreme Court's
decision and which influenced that decision. Part III critiques
the Supreme Court decision in Terry and asks whether the
Court was really trying to impose the restraints of the Fourth
Amendment on the most common form of police-citizen street
interactions or whether the Court was bowing to its fears of
what was happening on the streets in urban America in 1968.
Part IV discusses how the Terry decision opened the door for
successor Courts to define "stop" to exclude most on-the-street
encounters from the Terry definition of stop, thereby
eliminating all judicial oversight of such encounters. Part V
discusses the Terry reasonableness standard which evolved
into reasonable suspicion, and how that standard, too, has
been watered-down to expose people in urban, minority
neighborhoods to intrusive police investigations with virtually
no evidence of any intended criminal behavior. This article
suggests that terms like "high crime area" or "high drug
trafficking area" have becomeproxies for race. While the Terry
majority of eight justices may not have anticipated how
extensively the later Courts would weaken the protections
which the Terry Court purported to impose, the Warren Court
opened the door for the subsequent restrictions on individual
rights by its standardless decision in Terry.
430 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74
PART I: THE FACTS OF THE STOP
The vast power of police to stop and conduct limited
searches of citizens on less than probable cause was affirmed
in a case originating on the streets of Cleveland, Ohio. The
stop in Terry, when examined closely, fails the reasonableness
standard developed by the Court to uphold the stop and frisk
and subsequent arrest of Terry and his two companions. We
need to examine carefully the facts leading to that stop, as
well as the stop itself, in order to fully understand the impli-
cations of the decision.
On Halloween mid-afternoon in 1963, Martin McFadden,
a plain clothes Cleveland Police detective, was patrolling his
regular beat in downtown Cleveland." He was looking for
shoplifters and pickpockets, as he had done for over 35
years." McFadden testified "that he had developed routine
habits of observation over the years and that he would 'stand
and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals
of the day."'''
Officer McFadden observed two black men, John Terry
and Richard Chilton. He testified that when he looked at Ter-
ry and Chilton standing on the street, "they didn't look right to
me at the time,"" although he was not acquainted with either
man by name or sight, and he had received "[albsolutely no
information regarding [the] men at all."" Officer McFadden
did not explain what about the two men "didn't look right" to
him." The two men were dressed in topcoats, the standard
dress of the day." They were engaged in no unusual behavior
when they initially attracted McFadden's attention." When
30 Transcript of Chilton's Trial, reprinted in State of Ohio v, Richard D.
Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry; The Suppression Hearing and Trial
Transcripts. 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1387, app. B at 1449 (John Q. Barrett ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Transcript].
31 [d.
3~ [d. at 1456.
aa Id. (emphasis added).
3-4 Id.
" Id.
ae Id. at 1457.
J7 [d. at 1456.
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pressed on what about the two men attracted his interest and
whether he would pursue them as he did if he saw them that
day across from the court house, OfficerMcFadden replied, "I
really don't know.'?"
What happened as McFadden studied Terry and Chilton
depends upon which version of OfficerMcFadden's statement
of the facts one reads and in which court opinion the facts
appear. McFadden watched the men over a period ten min-
utes." He watched as one of the two men left the other and
walked down the street and looked inside a shop window and
continued walking, and then walked back to the other man,
again looking in the shop window." The second man then
repeated the same behavior." That behavior is the critical
conductwhich gives rise to the stop in this case. If they did it
once or twice each, their behavior was pretty unremarkable.
So, how many times they looked in the store window is cru-
cial. In the police report filed the same day as the incident,
Officer McFadden wrote that the men did this "about three
times each.?" Between the day of the event when he wrote
the police report and his memory was freshest, and the sup-
pression hearing, which was almost one year to the day after
the event, Officer McFadden's memory changed. At the sup-
pression hearing three times each became "at least four or five
times apiece.?" which later turned into four to six trips
each." Moreover, at trial, when asked how many trips he
observed,OfficerMcFadden replied, "about four trips, three to
four trips, maybe four to five trips, maybe a little more, it
might be a little less. I don't know, I didn't count the trips. '>45
The Ohio Court of Appeals decision in the case picked up on
the uncertainty and asserted that the men separated and
" [d. at 142l.
aa [d. at 1457.
40 Id.
41 [d.
42 Police report from Officer McFadden, to the Cleveland Ohio Police Depart-
ment (Oct. 31, 1963) (on me with the Cleveland Ohio Police Department) [herein-
after Police Report].
U Transcript, supra note 30, at 1402.
" [d. at 1407.
45 'd. at 1457 (emphasis added),
• •••u ...... ..' ....--..,-_ .....,.-.-........." ........'--....,. . .....-,;~.~w .._..._
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looked in the window "at least two to five times" each." How-
ever, by the time the fact worked its way into Chief Justice
Warren's majority opinion in the Supreme Court, the number
expands exponentially. He wrote that the men did this "be-
tween five or six times apiece-in all roughly a dozen trips.?"
Later in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren came up
with still another number when he described Terry and
Chilton's behavior: "where these men pace alternately along
an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window
roughly twenty-four times." The body of law which stems
from Terry is dependent upon this single fact.
Officer McFadden was never sure which' store was the
subject of the suspects' attention. At the suppression hearing
he admitted he had no experience in observing the activities of
individuals who were "casing" a store for a robbery." In the
police report, Officer McFadden indicated that they were look-
ing in an airline ticket office; at the suppression hearing, the
Detective mentioned an airline office or a jewelry store."
Chief Justice Warren (wisely) chose not to focus on this issue.
If the men were "casing a ... stickup,'?' as Officer McFadden
believed, a downtown airline office would be unlikely to pro-
duce significant cash. Even in 1963, airline tickets were rarely
purchased with cash. A jewelry store would be a more lucra-
tive target. Terry and Chilton's street behavior and the sup-
posed target of their interest are extremely important issues
because they are all that set apart these suspects from any
other two people on the street, unless it was their race.
The third man, Carl Katz, a white man, approached Terry
and Chilton in conversation." McFadden did not know the
white man either." McFadden suspected that the two black
" State v, Terry. 214 N.E.2d 114. 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), affd, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
41 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6 (counting each trip back and forth counting as two
observations into the store window).
~8 [d. at 23.
49 Transcript, supra note 30, at 1420.
se ld: at 1457.
" Id. at 1418.
" Id. at 1408.
S3 Id. at 1458.
.. Id. at 1418, 1466.
.. Id. at 1409.
5(f Id.
51 [d.
" Id. at 1411.
es Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968).
.. Id.
61 Id.
62 Transcript, supra note 30, at 1465.
63 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
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men were "casing a job, a stick-up," and he feared they may
have a gun." Cleveland was a segregated city, and police lore
had it that the only time whites and blacks congregated was
to plan or commit a crime. When Terry and Chilton walked
on, turning a corner and walking down the street, they
stopped in front of Zucker's, a men's clothing store, where they
met up again with Katz." At that point, McFadden decided
to act.
OfficerMcFadden walked over to the three men, identified
himself as a police officer, and asked for their names."
McFadden testified that he received a mumbled response to
his inquiry." McFadden then immediately grabbed Terry,
spun him around, and "patted down the outside of his cloth-
ing." When Officer McFadden felt a pistol in the inside
breast pocket of Terry's overcoat, the Supreme Court reported
that McFadden, then, reached inside the overcoat to retrieve
the pistol but was unable to do SO,59 He ordered all three men
into the clothing store where he removed Terry's overcoat and
removed a .38-caliber automatic pistol." He then ordered all
three men to face the wall, and proceeded to pat-down "the
outer clothing of Chilton and the third man, Katz."?' finding
a .38-caliber revolver in Chilton's pocket, but no weapon on
Carl Katz." Warren went on:
The officertestified that he onlypatted the men downto see
whether they had weapons,and that he did not put his hands
beneath the outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until
he felt their guns. Sofar as appearsfromthe record,he never
placedhis hands beneath Katz' outer garments."
434 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL (VOL. 74
All three men were arrested and taken to the police station."
Eventually, Terry and Chilton were formally charged with
carrying concealed weapons." Katz was held as a "suspicious
person" and then released two days later."
Chief Justice Warren's recitation of the facts was essential
to the outcome of the case in the Supreme Court and the devel-
opment of the rules pertaining to stop and frisk. There is a
marked contrast between Chief Justice Warren's selective ac-
count of the facts of the case derived from some of McFadden's
testimony at the suppression hearing and McFadden's initial
description of what happened that was contained in the police
report. The Detective's initial account reads quite differently:
At this point I approach these three men and informed them I
was a police officer and told them to keep their hands out of
their pockets. First one I searched was John WoodsTerry age
31 coloredof 1275 East 105th St. and in the inside pocket of
his topcoat (left side) found a 38 cal. automatic, name on
same P. Baretta-cal.9 Corto-M.1934 Brevet- Cardone V.T.
1941xlx serial NO. 897012. One bullet was in the chamber 6
bullets in the clip.
On searching Richard D[.] Chilton age 32 of 1610 Lotus
Dr found a 38 cal revolver loaded with 5 bullets Name
Hopkins and Alen MfgCo Pt. Jan 5 -88X- L Double action].]
Found this gun in the right hand front pocket of the topcoat
Chilton was wearing. Serial NO 5209
Searching Carl Katz white age 49 of 3755 Mayfield Rd
found no weapons. Request that these two guns be turned
over to Ballistics to be checkedout.
Also request that the three above mentioned men be
checked out by the RobberySquad."
The first significant difference is that McFadden ordered
the men to keep their hands out of their pockets when he inter-
64 Transcript, supra note 30, at 1456.
" !d. at 1518.
66 Jd. at 1465.
67 Police Report, supra note 42. Officer McFadden testified, "I ordered the
three of them inside the store and told them to keep tbeir-.". Transcript, supra
note 30, at 1412.
.. [d. at 1459-60.
" [d. at 1461-62.
'" [d. at 1462. Under the Fourth Amendment case law that existed in 1963,
the three men were forcibly detained without probable cause. They were arrested
and the subsequent search for weapons, whether a full search OT a pat down
frisk, was illegal. It is only after the Supreme Court decision in Terry that inves-
tigatory detentions were distinguished from arrests, and limited pat-down searches
for weapons were distinguished from searches of the person. [d. at 1461-62. Even
though such distinctions did not matter in 1963 at the time of the searches in
Terry, it is very possible that Officer McFadden only conducted a pat-down search
of the suspect, Terry. McFadden was acting alone; he had not summoned back-up
assistance. A pat-down from behind kept Terry between McFadden and the other
two suspects, and a pat-down rather than a search would have been less distract-
ing to McFadden and would have enabled him to keep track of the other two
suspects.
" N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO., ch. 86, § 180-a (1964) (current version at NY.
CRIM.PROC.§ 140.50 (McKinney 2004)); see People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (NY.
1964).
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cepted them. That fact never made it into the Supreme Court's
statement of the facts. The secondsignificant difference is that,
in the police report, OfficerMcFadden said that he "searched"
the men, but there is no reference to a pat-down frisk in the
police report. However, at the suppression hearing, the detec-
tive insisted that he conducted only a pat-down of the suspects'
outer clothing before reaching into the pockets of the two who
he believed were carrying weapons." The detective also testi-
fied that when he ordered the three men into Zucker's men's
store where he ordered a clerk to call for the wagon, he patted
down the other two men and retrieved a gun from suspect
Chilton's outer coat pocket:' He testified that he never
searched the third man, Katz, because the frisk did not reveal
that he possessed a gun."
PART II: HISTORY
Officer McFadden's stop and search was upheld in Ohio
courts even though there was no existing legal support for the
decision in Ohio law or from the United States Supreme Court.
There was ample discussion, however, in other state courts.
There was New York case law upholding such searches and
seizures on "reasonable suspicion" based upon a New York
statute."! In California, the state supreme court had upheld a
436 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74
stop and frisk of two men parked in a car on a lover's lane who
fled when police approached them." Justice Traynor wrote
that "the presence of two men in a parked automobile on a
lover's lane at night was reasonable cause for police investiga-
tion.?" The Illinois Supreme Court had also upheld a stop but
did not distinguish between probable cause and a lesser stan-
dard for the stop."
Citing to "early English practice," the New York statute,
and New York and other state court decisions, the Ohio court
of appeals said that policehave the right to stop and question
persons in suspicious circumstances without probable cause to
support an arrest." Having upheld the forcible detention, the
court said "it follows that the officer ought to be allowed to
'frisk,' under some circumstances at least, to insure that the
suspect does not possess a dangerous weapon which would put
the safety of the officerin peril.""
The United States Supreme Court decisionmust be under-
stood in the context of its time. When the case was docketed in
the United States Supreme Court the country seemed to be
coming apart at the seams." Nonviolent resistance to segrega-
l'I'lhe evidence needed to make [an] inquiry is not of the same degree or
conclusiveness as that required for an arrest .
. . [Tjhe incidence of crime in the neighborhood, the peculiar ap-
proaches of the defendant and his companion to the grill, the rapid
leaving when the police were seen (even in plain clothes three men in a
car watching could reasonably give alarm to a person alert to detection),
all justified the police stopping the defendant and questioning him..
Rivera. 201 N.E.2d at 34-35.
" People v. Martin, 293 P.2d 52, 53 (Cal. 1956).
" Martin, 293 P.2d at 53.
" People v, Faginkrantz, 171 N.E.2d 5 (lll. 1960)
The defendant's unlikely explanation of his presence in an alley far from
his home at 4:30 A.M., and his inability to produce any indicia of owner-
ship of the car coupled with his admitted criminal record and the history
of burglaries in the alley, gave the police reasonable cause to believe that
he was committing a crime.
Faginkrantz, 171 N.E.2d at 7.
" State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966),affd, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
" Terry, 214 N.E.2d at 120.
77 See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case
Study of the "Neur Federalism" in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST.L. 367, 372·73 (2001).
Just three months before Terry, the report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (often called the Kerner Commission) ex-
plained the connection between the urban riots of the 1960's and police
conduct towards minorities in unambiguous terms. Hostility between
blacks and police was a major factor-indeed, sometimes the precipitating
factor-in several of these riots.
Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur
repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of
the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the police.
The Kerner Commission's report was not the first to make this point.
Just a year before, the President's Commissionon Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice had come to a very similar conclusion.
The Commissionwrote that:
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tion and other Jim Crowpractices had stalled; black nationalist
voices were advocating that white violence should be met in
kind." Urban rioting unsettled the country as had massive
protests against the Vietnam war. There was a growing white
backlash to civil rights advances. That backlash was often
violent.
There was also a marked increase in violent crime
throughout the sixties and an even greater increase in the fear
of crime." In the trial court, the case was State v. Chilton, but
In case the Justices had somehow missed the unmistakable
evidence in these reports and elsewhere that racial injustice at the
hands of the police was unavoidably intertwined with the issues in
Terry, the amicus brief filed by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund made the point in the starkest possible terms. It
leaves little doubt that how police treated minorities in street en-
counters was a matter of grave concern to those combating discrim-
ination against blacks.
Id. at 372-73 (footnotes omitted); see also, Adina Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their
Guns": The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 317 (1996)
(discussing the commission reports and other racial factors).
78 Harris, supra note 77, at 371-73.
79 At the suppression hearing, the assistant county prosecutor stated, "crimes
(were) on the increase, crimes of violent nature (were] on the increase, [and]
crimes of carrying a gun [were] on the increase." Transcript, supra note 30, at
1434. The trial court agreed that "crime ... has been on the increase." [d. at
1445.
In the five years from 1960-1965there was a 24.4% increase in the violent
crime rate in America. Between 1965-1970 the rate jumped to 81.6%. Over the
decade there was a 125.9% increase in violent crime rate. Furthermore, between
1960-2001, the years leading up to the Terry decision, were the largest annual
438 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74
by the time the case arrived in the Supreme Court it had be-
come Terry v. Ohio. John Chilton, who like Terry was already
out of prison on the weapons conviction, was shot and killed
while robbing a Columbus, Ohio, drugstore, after shooting and
maiming the owner of the drugstore. This seemed to verify
Officer McFadden's suspicions five years earlier." Between
the time the case was argued in December 1967, and the time
the decision was handed down on June 10, 1968, Dr. Martin
Luther King had been murdered in Memphis, 'Tennessee."
His death was immediately followed by large-scale rioting in
many cities." Senator Robert Kennedy was murdered as he
left the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles after claiming victory
in the California presidential primary just five days before the
Court issued its decision in Terry."
The Supreme Court stood at the center of much of the
backlash to the changes in America during the sixties." The
increases in the national rate of violent crime. Between 1966-1967 the increase
was 15,1% and between 1967-1968 the increase was 17.9%. Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics, Violent Crime in the United States, FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs (last visited May 13, 2004).
~o Terence Sheridan, Court Upholds Friskings, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
June 11. 1968. at 58.
91 David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspi-
cion. Cotegoricci Judgments; Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality
under Terry v, Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV, 975, 979-80 (1998).
8lI Harris, supra note 81, at 980.
93 Jose F. Anderson, Perspectiues on Missouri v. Jenkins: Abandoning the Un-
finished Business of Public School Desegregation "With All Deliberate Speed", 39
How. L.J. 693, 716 n.123 (1996),
114 See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was it Really So Defense-Minded),
The Burger Court (/s It Really So Prosecution-Orientedt), and Police Investigatory
Practices, in THE BURGER COURT(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
The last years of the Warren Court's "criminal procedure 'revolution" con-
stituted a period of social upheaval, marked by urban riots, violence in
the ghettos, and disorders on the campuses. The political assassinations
and near-assassinations of the late 19605, both Congress's and presiden-
tial candidate Richard Nixon's strong criticism of the Court, the "obviously
retaliatory" provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1968, and the ever-
soaring crime statistics and ever-spreading fears of the breakdown of
public order "combined to create an atmosphere that, to say the least,
was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren Court's mission
in criminal cases."
[d. at 67-68 (footnotes omitted); see also Stephen A. Saltsburg, Foreward: The Flow
and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69
GEO.L.J. 151 (1980).
Those opposed to the expansion of federal judicial control over police
activities saw their displeasure with the Supreme Court increase the
longer Earl Warren served. as Chief Justice. The criticism came from
many quarters, including law enforcement officials. Criminal procedure
decisions that appeared to tilt the balance of advantage toward the sus-
pect or the accused were vigorously attacked. Critics charged that the
Court had ignored reality by erecting procedural burdens that prevented
law enforcement officials from effectively protecting the safety of the com-
munity. They claimed that the rights of the public and the victims of
crime were receiving little notice from justices intent on fettering police
work.
[d. at 152 (footnotes omitted); see also Harris, supra note 81, at 978.
As 1968-a presidential election year-began, candidate Richard Nixon
made political points by promising that he would restore respect for the
law by correcting the mistakes of the Warren Court's liberal juriapru-
dence. Thus law and order and the struggle of "the peace forces ..
against the criminal forces" became one of the major issues in the presi-
dential campaign in 1968. It was against this backdrop----changes in the
legal environment embodied by Mapp, violent unrest in cities and on
campuses, racial confrontations, and political assassinations-that Terry
was decided.
Ed. at 981 (footnotes omitted) .
ae 347 U.S. 483 (1954).:
$6 Justice Walter Schaefer, Panelists Comments, 54 Ky. L.J. 499, 521 (1966)
("And putting on flesh and blood-s-coming face-to-face with our ideals and looking
them in the teeth-is not always a comfortable process, nor is it always an easy
one.").
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Court was at the heart of the desegregation battles. The Court
also stood at the very center of the due process revolution,
trying to make the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial a
reality. No decisions of the Warren Court, other than Brown v.
Board of Educationi" more rankled southerners and other
conservatives, than the Court's 1961 decision, Mapp u. Ohio
which applied the exclusionary rule to the states, and Miranda
u. Arizona in 1966, which limited police interrogation
practices." After Mapp, violations of a defendant's right to be
free from illegal arrests and searches were no longer without
remedy in states such as Ohio that had refused on its own to
apply the exclusionary rule. As a result, Mapp ensured that
some guilty defendants would go free as tangible evidence of
guilt was suppressed. The decisions in Mapp and Miranda
were attacked as coddling criminals, and the criminal justice
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system and the Supreme Court had become issues in the up-
coming 1968 presidential election. "Impeach Earl Warren" signs
appeared along highways in most parts of the country."
The case landed in a weary Warren Court little more than
a year away from its end. It became clear in Terry that the
Court was no longer able or willing to try, as it had done in
Mapp and Miranda, to engage in a major reform of the police
establishment.s• The Court, as it had in Miranda, could have
91 Joseph L. Raub, Jr., Historical Perspectives: An Unabashed Liberal Looks At
a Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 233 (1990).
88 See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren
Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 518 (1975).
But surely the most fundamental reasons for the Court's loss of im-
petus lies in the social and political context of the Court in the late
1960's. That period was a time of social upheaval, violence in ghettos,
and disorder on campuses. Fears of the breakdown of public order were
widespread. Inevitably, the issue of law and order were politically exploit-
ed. In the presidential campaign of 1968 the bewildering problems of
crime in the United States were represented simply as a war between tile
"peace forces" and the "criminal forces." The decision in Miranda evoked a
chorus of criticism of the Court, ranging from the excited to the psychotic.
Congress responded with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, some provisions of which were obviously retaliatory. These
events combined to create an atmosphere that, to say the least, was unfa-
vorable to the continued vitality of the Warren Court's mission in crimi-
nal cases.
Id. at 538-39 (footnotes omitted). But see Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, The
Burger Court. and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320 (1977).
My colleague, Francis Allen, has suggested that the Warren Court had
lost its "impetus" for imposing new constitutional standards towards the
end of Chief Justice Warren's tenure. He notes in particular the decision
in Terry v. Ohio, decided during Chief Justice Warren's next-to-last term.
Terry's significance arguably extends beyond the Court's specific ruling
that a frisk justified by less than probable cause is permissible under the
[F'[ourth [Ajmendment. Though its recognition of the practical limitations
that undermine the deterrent impact of the exclusionary sanction, Chief
Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Terry may have laid the
groundwork for future challenges to that sanction by the Burger Court.
Terry may also be viewed as reflecting new doubts within the Warren
Court's liberal majority as to the wisdom of adopting excessive "prophylac-
tic" standards to preserve basic guarantees. Professor Allen suggests that
Terry and other Court decisions in the late 19605 may indicate that the
Court was being forced back into the mainstream of a community consen-
sus primarily concerned with effective law enforcement. Such a shift
would have been quite understandable in light of the intense reactions to
violent crime and riots during the late 1960s. If the Warren Court had
indeed started such a shift, then the Burger Court might be viewed in a
quite different light when compared with its predecessor.
The civil libertarian may justifiably argue, however, that the deci-
sions of the late 19605 did not reflect any overall change in the posture
of the Warren Court. While Terry may be viewed as an illustration of the
Warren Court's eventual retreat from its earlier "expansionist phase," it
also may be viewed as just another example of the Warren Court's special
difficulties in dealing with [Flourth [Almendment issues.
Id. at 1346-47 (footnotes omitted).
89 Cf Allen, supra note 88.
These rules avoid or lessen the occasions that require consideration of the
"totality of the circumstances" presented by the record and the concomi-
tant determination whether, on balance, the defendant received a fair
trial in the particular case. The principal advantages of per ee rules to a
Court embracing broad supervision of criminal justice function were
thought to be two. First, such rules give relatively certain guidance to the
lower courts, and thus avoid the confusions and uncertainties associated
with precedents that weigh a multitude of factors, some of which may be
unique to the particular case at hand. Second, such rules are applicable
to a great mass of cases at the trial court levels without direct in-
volvement of the Supreme Court, thereby minimizing the consequences of
the Court's lack of time and resources to adjudicate than the smallest
fraction of criminal cases presenting constitutional iseuea.
Id. at 532 (footnotes omitted)
~CI See generally Mark A.' Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitution-
at Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAML. REV. 715 (1994) (providing a detailed analy-
SIS of Terry and Miranda).
91 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
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made the legitimacy of an investigatory detention dependant
upon police compliance with a set of prophylactic rules." Of
course, the same argument that was made in response to
Miranda would have surfaced: that creation of a set of tight
rules would be legislating and would have exceeded the Court's
authority to determine whether a defendant was convicted in
accordancewith the Constitution."
PART III: THE DECISION
In the majority opinion in Terry, Chief Justice Warren
initially framed the controversy presenting the two competing
global views on stop and frisk: that "the police should be al-
lowed to 'stop' a person and detain him briefly for questioning
upon suspicion that he may be connectedwith criminal activi-
ty,"'" versus "that there is not-and cannot be-a variety of
"". ....... - .._'--' .. , ..... "'"· ..... •..... t .......... .-'~ ..+-tf-.,~ _ ..
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police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary
cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest
based upon probable cause to make such an arrest.""
He then digressed and explained how the effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule is limited where, presumably as in this
case, "obtaining convictions is [not] an important objective of
the police."" Rather, he pointed out how the exclusionary rule
"is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting
or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of
serving some other goal.?" The Court addressed the issue of
the day and said that "[tlhe wholesale harassment by certain
elements of the police community, of which minority groups,
particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped
by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial."
sa [d. at 11.
93 Id. at 14. See generally Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and
Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 255
(1961) ("Police officers are not controlled more rigorously by the exclusionary
evidence rule than they are by force of their own respect for the law. If police
obey the rules set by the community to govern police practice, they obviously will
not obtain evidence illegally. The point is often missed."). See also Frank J.
McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An III Conceived and Ineffective Remedy 52 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLIGE SCI. 266 (1961).
1 cannot accept the proposition that turning criminals loose on society by
suppressing illegally seized evidence does adequately solve the problem of
punishing the over zealous and misbehaving officer. It punishes, in fact,
the innocent citizenry. The officer is not disciplined for the failure to
obtain a conviction. The officer is not disciplined in our modern society
for his illegal search. The federal exclusionary rule in effect now for near-
ly fifty years has not noticeably deterred illegal searches and seizures
which, if the civil liberties groups are to be believed, are as pressing a
problem today as they ever were.
Id. at 267-68; see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and The Rights
of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785 (1970).
But if the Court strikes down a police practice, announces a "right" of a
criminal suspect in his dealings with the police, God only knows what the
result will be. Out there in the formless void, some adjustment will un-
doubtedly be made to accommodate the new "right," but what the product
of this whole exercise will be remains unfathomable. So, again, the Court
is effectively disarmed.
[d. at 791.
94 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14,
95 ld. at 14-15; see Harris, supra note 77
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Not only did this statement signal that the Court was
backing down from the leadership role it had assumed in Mapp
and Miranda, it amounted to an amazing admission of
powerlessness from a Court that purported to care about the
issue. That admission was a prelude to sanctioning a tool that
would exponentially ratify increased policepower on the street,
a tool which would be very susceptible to abuse and arbitrary
and discriminatory police conduct. Then the Court applied the
standard it had set for measuring the reasonableness of the
exercise of that tool to the facts of the case in such a way to
signal that the reasonableness standard would only operate as
a brake upon the most egregious exercises of police power. The
standard adopted and applied in Terry had the effect of a
stamp of approval on such policebehavior.
The Court seemed resigned to its powerlessness: that no
matter how it ruled in Terry, it would have little impact on the
streets because no matter the rule, police would not obey it.
Thus, the Court elected not to marshal whatever was left of its
moral strength to demand that police obey the law while en-
forcing it." By the time Terry came before the Warren Court,
These words may appear a bit puzzling. The Court appeared to give
credence to the idea that aggressive police practices like stops and frisks
impact blacks and other minorities disproportionately. At the same time,
it says 'that it will not require the use of the exclusionary rule in these
situations, since excluding evidence cannot affect police conduct not tar-
geted at securing evidence. Understandably, commentators have drawn
different implications from these seemingly opposed strands of argument.
Nevertheless, the effect of racial discrimination by law enforcement did
indeed make up an important part of what the Supreme Court hoped to
accomplish. By acknowledging the racial implications of the police practic-
es it decided to allow and regulate, it brought the issue within the realm
of proper consideration in constitutional criminal procedure. Terry repre-
sents a clear signal that the racial aspects of police procedure did indeed
make a difference, and could be addressed in discussion of t.he constitu-
tional regulation of police procedure.
ld. at 374 (footnotes omitted).
96 See Allen, supra note 88.
Admittedly, local police forces are expected to be accountable to the agen-
cies of local government that create and maintain them. In reality, how-
ever, one of the striking characteristics of American police agencies, both
at the state and federal level, is the degree to which they have succeeded
at eluding genuine accountability to civil authority. Indeed, the upper
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it apparently lacked the strength and courage it once had to try
to reshape America.
The Court then turned to the issues of the case, focusing
predominantly upon the frisk, which the Court saw as "[t]he
crux of the case.?"
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge
that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome
issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity-issues
which have never before been squarely presented to this
Court. Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical
and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on
both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to
"stop and frisk"-as it is sometimes euphemistically
termed-suspicious persons."
However, this analysis virtually ignored the critical threshold
question of when the stop occurred, a question which Chief
Justice Warren admitted was a trigger issue of controversy in
the country." For Terry to provide meaningful guidance, the
Court needed to expand on this "trigger issue," which the Court
candidly acknowledged was its first task.!" The Fourth
Amendment protection of reasonableness would not apply until
there was a seizure within the meaning of the amendment. As
Chief Justice Warren pointed out, prior to a seizure, a police
officer, like any other citizen, is free to talk to people on the
street without implicating the Fourth Amendment.'?' The
levels of the police hierarchy itself are often unable to maintain effective
supervision over the lower levels.
Id. at 524.
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
.. Id. at 9-10.
" Id. at IS.
100 [d.
101 Id. at 13.
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich
in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or
mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men involv-
ing arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are
not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner I only
to take a different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element
into the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide
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Court failed to note, nor has ever later acknowledged, that a
police officer's request for information carries with it a certain
compulsion that does not accompany one citizen's request for
information from another.
A. The Stop
The Court admitted that the stop could have occurred
either when McFadden approached the men or when McFadden
spun Terry around. However, the Court was clearly ambivalent
as to when the stop occurred and thus never conclusively stated
when Terry was seized.
Onlywhen the officer,by means of physicalforceor showof
authority, has in someway restrained the liberty of a citizen
maywe concludethat a "seizure"has occurred.Wecannot tell
with any certainty upon this recordwhether any such "sei-
zure" tookplacehere prior to OfficerMcFadden'sinitiation of
physicalcontact for purposesof searchingTerry for weapons,
and we thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion
upon constitutionalityprotectedrights had occurred.l"
variety of purposes, some of w hich are wholly unrelated to a desire to
prosecute for crime.
Chief Justice Warren wrote that "McFadden 'seized' peti-
tioner and subjected him to a 'search' when he took hold of him
and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.'?" The
Court settled on the moment when OfficerMcFadden, receiving
no assuring response to his question, spun Terry around to use
him as a buffer between himself and the other two suspects
and frisked Terry's outer clothing." Choosing that precise
moment insulated the state from Fourth Amendment scrutiny
earlier in the encounter, delaying when the state had to estab-
lish reasonable cause for the seizure and the frisk. It also
raised a question as to whether the Court's assessment of rea-
sonableness was not at least partially based upon McFadden's
description of Terry's mumbled response to McFadden's inqui-
[d.
lO2 ld. at 19 n.16.
ie [d. at 19.
104 Id. at 19 n.16.
&.,''tjfo •• , ---....-..-...-'_.~ ... I ....... _ ..... .....-'-...... ....... ~ ..~. • ••• <.
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ry.105Of course, the view that the three men were not seized
until Officer McFadden laid hands on Terry and spun him
around is dependent upon concluding that reasonable persons
in Terry, Chilton and Katz's position would not have felt com-
pelled to remain on the scene and respond to McFadden even
before the moment that Terry was grabbed, but, instead, could
have refused to cooperate and walked away.'?" Only an os-
trich could reach that conclusion. It requires ignoring, which
the Court did, McFadden's order to the three men to keep their
hands out of their pockets, and it requires ignoring the power
and implicit threat of violence that police posed when dealing
with black men on the street in 1968. If the Court truly could
not tell precisely when the seizure took place, that uncertainty
demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the relation-
ship on the street between police and citizens, especially be-
tween police and black citizens. It is an understanding that the
present Court totally lacks, but we had expected better of the
Warren Court.
On the other hand, there is also language in Chief Justice
Warren's opinion and in the separate concurring opinions of
Justices White and Harlan that signals a belief that when
Officer McFadden confronted Terry, Chilton and Katz, he
seized the three men within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
merit.'?' This should have been an obvious conclusion. When
105 See id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained
or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However, given
the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the
person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions
are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to an-
swer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for con-
tinued observation.
[d. (White, J., concurring); see also Hiibel v. Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004)
(holding that a Nevada "stop and identify" statute that requires a suspect to dis-
close his name in the course of a valid Terry stop does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
". See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that a
Fourth Amendment seizure from police questioning occurs only where a reason-
able person would feel compelled to stay),
107 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S, at 30.
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Officer McFadden confronted the three men, identified himself
as a police officer, and ordered them to keep their hands out of
their pockets,':" they were hardly free to disregard the
officer's questions and walk away.
There is no easy explanation for the Court's ambivalence
about when the seizure took place. It is difficult to explain be-
cause the Court was not very precise and the encounter esca-
lated very quickly: "When the men 'mumbled something' in
response to his inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner
Terry, spun him around ... and patted down the outside of his
clothing."!" There were just few seconds between the initia-
tion of the encounter and the laying on of hands to allow for
much consideration as to when exactly the three men were
seized. Nothing of substance changed between the time
McFadden accosted the three and when he laid hands on Terry.
The Court held that based on the facts, Officer McFadden
had reasonable suspicion from the outset, and therefore, the
timing of the stop was not outcome determinative.I'" Eight
Justices appeared to believe that "specific and articulable facts
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual con-
duct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id.; id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) C'His justifiable suspicion afforded a proper
constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of movement briefly,
and addressing questions to him, and Officer McFadden did so.").
There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from
addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstanc-
es, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse
to cooperate and go on his way. However, given the proper circumstances,
such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly
detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him.
[d. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
1011 Police Report, supra note 42.
Hl9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
110 [d. at 28, 30.
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which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrantledl" an intrusion at that moment.'!' How-
ever, the failure to determine when the stop occurred had ma-
jor repercussions for subsequent decisions over the next four
decades.':" Chief Justice Warren's lack of insight into the rip-
IU Id. at 21.
112 See Harris, supra note 81,
Unfortunately, Terry and its companion cases do not deal directly with
the issue of what constitutes sufficient grounds for a stop. In Terry, the
Court said that the central issue was not the propriety of the stop but
the frisk, and all but refused to discuss the stop; in Sibron v. New York,
the Court proceeded directly to a discussion of the frisk without any con-
sideration of the seizure of the defendant and his removal from the place
where the officer found him. Despite Justice Harlan's prodding, the Court
did nothing more in Terry and Sibron to define what it would accept as
the legal basis for a stop, an issue "on which courts, lawyers and police
deserve guidance." Thus the task was left to subsequent decisions.
[d. at 988~89 (footnotes omitted); see also Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right
of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258
(1990)
In Terry, the government argued that police conduct that detains a per-
son, but falls short of a traditional arrest, is not a "seizure" within the
meaning of the {F]ourth IA]mendment. The Terry Court "emphatically
reject.led] this notion." It explained that "whenever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person." Although the Court stressed this definition of "seizure," it did not
clearly apply its definifion to the facts at hand. The Court claimed that it
could not determine whether any seizure occurred before Officer
McFadden physically contacted Terry. Consequently, it assumed that be-
fore McFadden frisked Terry, "no intrusion upon constitutionally protected
rights had occurred."
The Court's uncertainty seems strained. If, as the Court stated, a
seizure occurs whenever an officer accosts a citizen and restrains his or
her freedom, than Terry and his companions were seized prior to the
frisk Under either of the Court's definitions of "seizure," it seems
clear that Terry was seized before Officer McFadden grabbed him. Justice
Harlan thought so. He explained that the officer's observations justified
accosting Terry and "restraining his liberty of movement." Indeed, only
the most defiant citizen would feel free to leave a police officer under
such conditions. Nevertheless, the Terry majority assumed that no intru-
sion had occurred that implicated the [F'[ourth [A]mendment. Had the
Court directly confronted the facts, it would have been forced to acknowl-
edge that accosting a person on the street restrains liberty and demands
fourth amendment scrutiny.
Id. at 1297-98 (footnotes omitted); see also Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Miechief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV.
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pie effects of this factual determination paved the way for the
later Supreme Court to hold that Fourth Amendment seizures
occur far later in a police-citizen encounter, thus delaying
citizens' Fourth Amendment protections and shielding police
from the amendment's limitations. The result is unfettered
discretionary power which has resulted in an erosion of civil
liberties and an arguably unrestrained sanctioning of police
powers.!"
383 (1988),
The Court's apparent failure to recognize the potential import of its
holdings in Camara and Terry heightened the impact of their conceptual
changes in [F]ourth [Almendment interpretation. Both cases significantly
altered the traditional relationship between the {R]easonableness and
[W]arrant [Cllauses, and yet the Court did not address their implications
beyond the relatively discrete areas of housing inspections and stops and
frisks. That several of the Justices who have protested most vocally to
expanding the reasonableness balancing test concurred in Terry and
Camara-the cases which made the expansion possible-best evidences
the Court's failure to appreciate the implications of the changes at the
time they were made. The Court had unloosed reasonableness but seemed
uncertain about where the new doctrine was going or how to constrain it.
What was certain, however, was that each subsequent case would add to
the controversy over the proper realm of probable cause and the reason-
ableness balancing test, further fracturing fourth amendment analysis.
[d. at 404-06 (footnotes omitted); cf Kamisar, supra note 84.
The Warren Court's opinions in the stop and frisk cases leave much
to be desired. The [J]ustices "detoured around" the threshold issue of
investigative "stops," one on which the lower courts, lawyers, and police
deserved guidance, and discussed only the "frisk" issue; strained a good
deal to avoid explaining how the police, after removing an opaque envelop
[aic] from a "frisked" suspect's pocket, could open the envelope to see
what was inside; seemed to misunderstand "classical 'stop and frisk' theo-
ry"; confused the limited search permitted to uncover weapons that may
be used to assault police with the more extensive search permitted when
an arrestee is about to be transported to the police station; and seemed
to assume that a less restrictive Fourth Amendment test applies when
the police act without a search warrant (although the Court had repeated-
ly held to the contrary),
But the stop and frisk cases left such a spongy standard, one that
allowed police so much discretion and provided the courts so little basis
for meaningful review ... that these Warren Court decisions must have
been cause for celebration in more than a few precinct stations through-
out the land.
Id. at 65.
113 Cf Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Refusals to
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In the end, the majority eschewed a general principle and
simply stated, "we can only judge the facts of the case before
us.":" In fact, the Court stated that anything more might
hinder crime prevention.
Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be
used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human
injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.1I5
The Court's dismissal of the exclusionary rule mirrors some of
the harshest criticism leveled against the Court after 1961:
that its decision inMapp would hinder effective law snforcement.!"
Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1995) ("As the Court articu-
lated in United States v. Cortez, the Terry standard is not self-evident in practice:
'Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining;
they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situ-
ations that arise.") (footnotes omitted),
11. Terry, 392 U,S. at 15. "Doubtless some 'field interrogationlsl' conduct vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment," Id. at 13-14.
m Jd. at 15,
LI6 See Arlen Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor,
111 D. PA. L. REV. 4, 40-43, (1962) ("Some of the resentment to Mapp arises
from the manner in which the exclusionary rule was imposed upon the states.
The objection is frequently raised that a sudden change on such a fundamental
evidentiary question is properly a legislative, rather than a judicial function."); see
also Fred E. Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's
Stand, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 85 (1962).
Some eminent jurists of the past, including Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, at the time when he sat on the New York Court of Appeals,
were opposed to the exclusionary rule. In his celebrated opinion in People
u. Defore Justice Cardozo gave some clear cut, sensible reasons why New
York chose not to follow the exclusionary rule. He adhered to the view
that relevant evidence should not be brushed aside and ignored solely be-
cause of the methods the police used to obtain it, The great scholar, Dean
John Henry Wigmore, was opposed to the rule, and in his monumental
treatise on Evidence he pointed out the historically unfounded judicial
reasoning that was used in the first federal case to adopt the
exclusionary rule.
After all these years of a general recognition of the exclusionary rule
as a rule of evidence only, and after it was for so long proclaimed to be
such by the Supreme Court itself, the Court in Mapp u. Ohio suddenly
labels the rule to be a requirement of due process. Of little comfort is the
fact that three of the nine Lflusticea (Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker)
adhered to the former viewpoint.
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The Court seemed to surrender to that criticism in Terry. The
criticism is incomplete and unfair because it purports to exam-
ine the cost of applying the constitutional protection without
ever considering the costs of not applying the constitutional
protection.
Forty years later, no reasonable person could suggest that
it was improper for Officer McFadden to take some action.
However, the Court's conclusion that a strict application of the
exclusionary rule may hinder crime prevention was based on
the erroneous assumption that McFadden's only option was to
seize the men. He could have scrutinized their behavior by
continuing to follow them. He even could have let them know
without confronting them that he was a police officer. What
would have been the effect of such different behavior? If the
three men were contemplating a robbery, as Officer McFadden
Why this change in the Court's attitude? The answer, in my opinion,
is very simple. It's just another example of the Court's continuing efforts
to police the police-and that is an executive, or at most a legislative
function of government. It certainly is not the constitutional function of
the judiciary.
[d. at 88-87 (footnotes omitted). But see Yale Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRIM. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
171 (962) (criticizing Inbau's arguments against Mapp u, Ohio). For further
criticism of the arguments against Mapp, see Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Crim-
inal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004).
After Brown gave blacks equality in education, it was only a matter
of time before the Supreme Court would turn to racial equality in other
contexts, such as criminal procedure. Indeed, as the civil rights movement
gained momentum, the notion that blacks should be protected in their
civil rights, but not when their liberty and lives were at stake, must have
seemed patently absurd.
Thus, for several reasons I 1961 presented a much more favorable
climate to launch a criminal procedure revolution, starting with restraints
on police power, than had earlier years .... Moreover, by 1961, the
nation as a whole was less tolerant of local law enforcement abuses and
more receptive to the notion of federal intervention in traditional state af-
fairs. The Supreme Court's decision in Mapp reflects these developments.
In Mapp, the Court took power from the states at a time when the states
could not be trusted and protected blacks at a time when the nation was
awakening to the need to protect them. A£ such, the common conception
of Mapp as an aggressively countermajoritarian decision is simply inaccu-
rate.
ld. at 1389 (footnotes omitted).
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believed, they would have dropped the plan once they were
aware that he suspected them. No robbery would have been
committed on that street at that time, and the suspected crime
would have been prevented in a far less invasive way. Natural-
ly, such a suggestion opens the door to the criticism that any-
thing less than a seizure, a search and ultimately an arrest
would have left the guns found on Terry and Chilton's persons
on the street and would have left the men free to commit a
robbery on another street at another time. Such criticism, how-
ever, assumes that the men were "casing a robbery," and there
was never any additional evidence that robbery was their pur-
pose.
B. Reasonableness of the Stop
After the Court glossed over the issue of when the stop
occurred, they moved onto the reasonableness of the stop.!"
First, the Court affirmed that terms such as "stop" and "frisk"
are not outside the Fourth Amendment.us Second, these non-
traditional seizures and searches are to be "tested by the
Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures," rather than the probable cause stan-
dard applicable to arrests and traditional searches.
ll9
Third,
the reasonableness of the intrusion will be determined "by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails.""OFourth, "in justifying
the particular intrusion the policeofficermust be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."l2l "Anything less would invite intrusions . . . based
on nothing more substantial than inarticulate huncheal.F?"
Fifth, the intrusion must be subject "to the more detached, neu-
tral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness
117 Terry I 392 U.S. at 20.
ue [d. at 19.
119 ld. at 20.
rec Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523. 537 (1967)).
121 ld. at 21.
12::;1 [d. at 22.
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of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular cir-
cumstances" and be subjected to "an objective standard: would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that the action taken was appropriate?"'23
Then the Court applied these principles to the Terry stop.
The Court stated that "effective crime prevention and detec-
tion" justifies a police officer "in appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner approach[ing] a person for purposes
of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is
no probable cause to make an arrest.'?"
Itwas this legitimate investigative function OfficerMcFadden
was discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and
his companions. He had observedTerry, Chilton, and Katz go
through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in
itself, but which taken together warranted further investiga-
tion. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together
on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there
anything suspicious about people in such circumstances stroll-
ing up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows,
moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story is quite dif-
ferent where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for
an extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes
apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything;
where these men pace alternately along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window roughly [twenty-
four] times; where each completion of this route is followed
immediately by a conferencebetween the two men on the cor-
ner; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a
third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally
follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It
would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of
[thirty] years' experience in the detection of thievery from
stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate
this behavior further. 125
And with that pronouncement, the Court moved beyond the
rea [d. at 21-22.
124 ld. at 22.
126 Id. at 22-23.
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stop to the frisk which it considered the most important issue.
It is useful again to look closely at the facts that the Court
found sufficient to find the investigatory seizure reason-
able." That task is necessary to determine whether the deci-
sion was based upon "articulable facts and circumstances,,"7
or an "inarticulate hunch"!" and must be used as guidance to
measure different fact situations following Terry.
First, Officer McFadden was not readily forthcoming about
why Terry and Chilton initially aroused his curiosity on that
crowded downtown street. For some reason, he was watching
the two men from the outset even though he did not know
them or anything about them."9 Of course, watching people
on the street does not interfere with Fourth Amendment rights
and need not be justified. The only facts that Officer McFadden
could articulate to support the seizure were the trips two of the
suspects, Terry and Chilton, made to look in a store window
and then return to confer with the other and with KatZ.!30
Second, the Court played fast and loose with the most
important fact in the case: the number of trips Terry and
Chilton made up the street and how many times they looked
into the store window. Warren reported that the two men
looked into the window twenty-four times. lSI That figure is
reported with a certainty that the evidence does not support.
McFadden was confused about how many times this occurred; a
fair reading of the many times he stated what happened leads
to the conclusion that they looked into the window between
four and twenty-four times. His police report written immedi-
ately after the arrests stated that each man made three
tripS.'32This fact is critical because it is unclear as to wheth-
er the seizure would have been reasonable based on fewer
observations of the store window.
126 [d. at 32-33 (Harlan, .l., concurring). Note that the Terry majority never
used the term reasonable suspicion.
121 [d. at 21.
128 Id. at 22.
U'l [d. at 5.
130 [d. at 6.
131 ld. at 23.
132 Police Report, supra note 42.
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Third, OfficerMcFadden could not identify which store the
men were looking into. Initially, he thought they were looking
into an airline officewhich would not have had a large amount
of cash on hand or merchandise that might have attracted
them. He singled out the airline office in the police report. At
the suppression hearing, a year later, Officer McFadden testi-
fied that he thought a jewelry store was the target.
Fourth, by the time OfficerMcFadden confronted the three
men, they had apparently given up on whichever store had
been the target of their repeated trips and interest. At that
time the two men were conducting themselves "[l]ike anybody
else."!" They walked for three minutes in that fashion beyond
the two stores, turned the corner and were walking down a
different street.!" After walking that distance, they stopped
in front of a men's clothing store, where OfficerMcFadden had
moved,where they were joined by the third man, and the three
talked for a minute or two.lOS OfficerMcFadden then accosted
the three men, identified himself as a police officer, ordered
them to keep their hands out of their pockets and asked their
names.F"
Finally, and of lesser significance, the men did identify
themselves when asked to by McFadden, even though Chief
Justice Warren characterized their response as a single mum-
bled response.':" McFadden testified that each man "gave [his
name] to me quick." 13'Inthe same direct examination, Officer
McFadden said, "They said something;"l3·on cross-examina-
tion in response to the prosecutor's question, OfficerMcFadden
said, "they mumbled something."l4O
The facts of the case, on which this major change in the
law rests, are ludicrous upon close examination. Chief Justice
Warren set up the test: whether the seizure was based on an
133 Transcript, supra note 30, at 1402.
,,. [d. at 1403.
135 [d.
lJ6 Id. at 1403-04.
137 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
138 Transcript, supra note 30, at 1403.
ra [d. at 1404.
140 Id. at 1409.
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"inarticulate hunch,,141rather than upon "articulable facts and
circumstances"!42 giving rise to a reasonable belief that a
crime was imminent. The limited information on which Officer
McFadden acted clearly points to his acting on a hunch which
might have warranted his continuing interest in them but
certainly not a lawful seizure based upon such paltry and con-
tradictory information. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Warren
concluded that Officer McFadden's seizure and search of the
men were reasonable.
He had observed Terry, together with Chilton and another
man, acting in a manner he took to be preface to a "stick-up."
We think on the facts and circumstances OfficerMcFadden
detailed before the trial judge a reasonably prudent man
wouldhave been warranted in believingpetitioner was armed
and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he
was investigating his suspiciousbehavior.The actions ofTer-
ry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis
that these men were contemplating a daylight rob-
bery-s-which,it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to
involve the use of weapons-and nothing in their conduct
from the time he first noticed them until the time he con-
fronted them and identified himself as a police officergave
him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.Althoughthe
trio had departed the original scene, there was nothing to
indicate abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at
some point. Thus, when OfficerMcFadden approached the
three men gathered before the display window at Zucker's
store he had observed enough to make it quite reasonable to
fear that they were armed; and nothing in their response to
his hailing them, identifyinghimself as a policeofficer,and
asking their names served to dispel that reasonablebelief.We
cannot say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat
his clothing for weaponswas the product of a volatile or in-
ventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of
harassment; the recordevidencesthe tempered act of a police-
man who in the course of an investigation had to make a
quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from
1.1 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
l~2 Id. at 21.
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possible danger, and took limited steps to do SO.'43
Ifit had not been for Justice Harlan filling in the gaps, the
Terry decision might have stood for allowing police to search
(frisk) any time a police officer becomesconcerned that a per-
son is armed, regardless ofwhether there was reasonable cause
to forcibly detain a suspect. Justice Harlan clarified that "the
right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a
forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime."'" The facts in
Terry justifying the forcible detention are so weak that they
should raise eyebrows even in those courtrooms where judges
are unusually inclined to favor the police.
What the Court, in fact, did was uphold a seizure on less
than probable cause based on little more than race. In so doing,
the Court virtually obliterated the Fourth Amendment
protections which it had imposed on the states, at least for
inner city young black men, exposing them, without legal pro-
tection, to the same police harassment that black men had
historically faced in their dealings with police dating to the
time of slavery.':" Incredibly, this was a Court sympathetic to
U3 Id. at 28.
144 Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring), While Justice Harlan would have made
the right to frisk automatically flow from the right to stop, subsequent law has
made them separate inquiries. Id.
145 See RUSSELL, supra note 9.
From 1619 to 1865, slave codes embodied the criminal law and pro-
cedure applied against enslaved Africans. The codes, which regulated
slave life from cradle to grave, were virtually uniform across states--each
with the overriding goal of upholding chattel slavery. The codes not only
enumerated the applicable law but also prescribed the social boundaries
for slaves-where they could go, what types of activity they could engage
in, and what type of contracts they could enter into .
. , . As indicated, slaves faced death for numerous criminal offenses.
Harsh sanctions, such as brutal public executions, were imposed to keep
slaves in their place. Under Maryland law, for example, a slave convicted
of murder was to be hanged, beheaded, then drawn and quartered. Fol-
lowing this, the head and body parts were to be publicly displayed.
Slaves lived with the constant fear that at any moment they might
be charged and convicted of crimes they did not commit. They also lived
with the knowledge that if they were the victims of crime, there was no
avenue for redress.
Id. at 14-16 (footnotes omitted).
.... ·~I •• - • f ..~ t._ t ~ ~~ .... ~... _~.
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this problem, but the decision in Terry, instead, revealed a
Court that was sympathetic to maintaining control over the
black population. Rather than strike a balance between legiti-
mate societal needs and individual rights as the Court claimed
it was doing, the Court struck the balance totally in favor of
the police .146
It is too late in the day to question the validity and reason-
ableness of investigatory stops on less than probable cause.!"
Common sense dictates that police must have reasonable power
to forcibly engage people before a crime is committed rather
than limiting police power to chasing criminals after the crime
is completed. However, the greatest harm in Terry is that it
ratified a stop without defining "stop" and did so on such weak
facts. Chief Justice Warren acknowledged the problem: the
need to prevent crime without losing control of the police who
may use these powers unfairly to harass black and Latino kids
on the streets.!" But the Terry outcome focused only on the
crime prevention issue and ignored the problems associated
with the exercise of the enormous power the Court in Terry
146 Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court suc-
cumbed to "hydraulic pressures. . that bear heavily on the Court to water
down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand."). Cf Jose F.
Anderson, Accountability Solutions in the Consent Search and Seizure Wasteland,
79 NEB. L, REV. 711 (2000).
The Warren Court's attempts to secure rights for the accused
through well intentioned opinions often resulted in opinions that were
difficult to justify under traditional scholarly analysis and that were often
crafted in a way that subjected them to attack. Nevertheless, the short-
comings advanced by the critics regarding the Court's approach to con-
stitutional decision-making should also recognize that the goal of govern-
ment accountability in criminal prosecutions is the primary focus of a
large portion of the Bill of Rights. They should also take into account the
fact that our country has a history of largely ignoring the rights of the
poor, oppressed, and those in the minority, even after express language
was written in the Constitution to protect them.
Id. at 747-48 (footnotes omitted).
Hi In the interest of full disclosure, I was an author of the amicus brief in
Terry submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union in which we argued that
the Fourth Amendment should not allow seizures of the person on less than prcb-
able cause. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union
of Ohio, Terry v. Ohio, 293 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67).
I~ Terry, 392 U.S. at 14~15.
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bestowed on the police. Thirty-seven years later those issues
have grown even more serious.':" In the end, Terry is the gen-
esis for later Justices, less inclined to limit police power, who
(1) narrowed the definition of "stop,"placing most citizen-police
encounters beyond the oversight of the Fourth Amendment,
and (2) even further watered-down the reasonable cause stan-
dard which was not strong to begin with in TerryI"
149 See generally William M. Carter, A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004) (arguing that
the practice of racial profiling engenders more than just individuals' subjectively
discriminatory views, but rather derives from the historical stigmatization of Afri-
can Americans as predisposed to criminality. dating back to the era of slavery);
Symposium, Racial Profiling: A New Road Hazard, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1
(2001).
rso See Sundby, supra note 5.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry is almost excruciatingly cautious
in his effort to explain the Court's departure from a norm of probable
cause and to limit the consequences of such a departure. Reduced to its
essence, the Chief Justice's holding is a relatively modest one, basically
creating a limited right of "self defense" for a police officer who in carry-
ing out her duties comes across someone whom she reasonably believes is
armed and dangerous. The problem with Terry, therefore, lies not in its
very limited upholding of stops and frisks (a holding most of the commen-
tators in this Symposium find acceptable). Rather, Terry's difficulty rests
in the long-term consequences it sowed by casting the holding in terms of
a broadly framed reasonableness balancing test. For although Chief Jus-
tice Warren's cautious opinion suggests that the use of the reasonableness
balancing test was meant to be viewed as a narrow departure from the
norm of probable cause, we now know that the test has taken on a life of
its own.
[d. at 1135 (footnotes omitted), But see Akhil R. Amar, Terry and Fourth: Amend.
ment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998).
[Terry] failed to define "search" and "seizure" broadly enough: Sustained
and purposeful surveillance by the unaided eye, the bad Terry implied, is
not a Fourth Amendment "search" and thus, apparently, need not be
reasonable. The bad Terry refused to retreat from earlier cases suggesting
that warrants are required "whenever practicable" and that in most situa-
tions only "exigent circumstances" will excuse the lack of a warrant. The
bad Terry offered no explanation-none whatsoever-why cops may some-
times search and seize without a warrant even in a situation where no
probable cause exists and thus no warrant could lawfully be issued by a
magistrate.. . The bad Terry hinted at some of the factors that bear on
reasonableness, but failed to develop a systematic account of these factors,
needlessly leading civil libertarians to worry that under a proper reason-
ableness regime, government would have free rein, And to the extent the
bad Terry could be read to imply that under a proper reasonableness
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PART IV: DEVELOPMENT OF THE STOP AFTER TERRY
Four years after Terry, the Supreme Court (now without
Chief Justice Warren) acknowledged what Terry never specifi-
cally, but impliedly, said: "A brief stop of a suspicious individu-
al ... may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to
the officer at the time.'?"
Despite the Terry Court's acknowledgment of problems on
the street when police use their power to harass certain groups,
historically young black men and boys,''' that Court failed to
analysis, searching in the absence of individualized susprcaon is always
unconstitutional-that there must always be "specific" facts pointing to
specific targets-the bad Terry offered civil libertarians false hope, and
made a promise that the Court cannot keep if it means to be faithful to
text, history, and common sense. Finally, the bad Terry, while acknowl-
edging the flaws of the exclusionary rule, nevertheless pledged allegiance
to it, and recycled silly arguments that the rule is somehow mandated by
the Constitution and by sound legal principles.
[d. at 1099-1100.
'" Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
(Terry and its companion cases] were the first cases in which this
Court explicitly recognized the concept of "stop and frisk" and squarely
held that police officers may, under appropriate circumstances, stop and
frisk persons suspected of criminal activity even though there is less than
probable cause for an arrest. This case marks our first opportunity to
give some flesh to the bones of Terry et ol. Unfortunately, the flesh pro-
vided by tcday'a decision cannot possibly be made to fit on Terry's skele-
tal framevvork.
Adams, 407 U.S. at 153-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 Harris, supra note 81.
In African-American communities, police did not so much follow the law
as embody it; residents simply had to put up with whatever version of
justice officers on the street chose to impose, no matter bow brutal or
unfair. By 1967. the abuse of blacks by police using stops and frisks-the
very technique at issue in Terry-had become such a pervasive experience
in inner city neighborhoods that the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice addressed the subject di-
rectly. "Misuse of field interrogations ... is causing serious friction with
minority groups in many localities. This is becoming particularly true as
more police departments adopt 'aggressive patrol' in which officers are
encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street."
Id.. at 980-81 (footnotes omitted); see also RUSSELL, supra note 9.
Police harassment comes in many forms. It is also demonstrated by
the number of times Black men are stopped, questioned, and assaulted by
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develop controls on how that newly sanctioned power might be
used.!" By focusing on the moment when Officer McFadden
police as they go about their daily lives.. The frequency of contact
between Black men and the police has led a generation of Black men to
teach their sons "The Lesson"-instructions on how to handle a police
stop.
Many black men have developed protective mechanisms to either
avoid vehicle stops by police or to minimize the potential for harm during
these stops, The primary shield they use is an altered public persona.
This includes a range of adaptive behaviors, e.g., sitting erect while driv-
ing, traveling at the precise posted speed limit, avoiding certain neighbor.
hoods, not wearing certain head gear (e.g., a baseball cap), and avoiding
flashy cars.
Black distrust of the justice system is not new. It is historically
rooted in the role police played in enforcing the slave codes, Black codes,
Jim Crow segregation, and the ultimate form of vigilante justice, lynching.
In his treatise on race in America, Gunnar Myrdal reported that between
1920 and 1932, White police officers were responsible for more than half
of all the murders of Black citizens, Historical accounts also show that
White policemen were often present at lynchings. Today, police brutality
barely resembles its past forms. Many Blacks alive today, however, still
remember the widespread, persistent, and inhwnane abuse Blacks suffered
at the hands of police.
Id. at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
ts See, e.g., United States v. Armijo, 781 F. Supp. 1551, 1554-55 (D.N.M.
1991). An officer questioned train passengers in New Mexico based on information
he received from a train employee. Armijo, 781 F. Supp. at 1555. The informant
indicated defendant as a possible drug courier because he "was a young, well-
dressed Hispanic wearing a gold watch and gold ring travelling [sic] in the first
class section." Id. at 1554. The officer followed the defendant to the parking lot
where Mr. Armijo greeted his mother and placed his luggage in a car. [d. at
1555. The officer approached the defendant and asked him several questions be-
fore identifying himself as a DEA agent and asking for identification and permis-
sian to search the luggage in the trunk. [d. After the defendant refused the
search, the officer threatened to "detain the car and Mr. Armijo's mother." [d.
The court held that this was a seizure, and that "neither Mr. Armijo's race nor
his refusal to consent, constitute reasonable suspicion that a crime was being
committed." Id. at 1557; see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir.
2000), overruled in part, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). An elderly
woman, who had been attacked in her home, reported that the assailant was a
black man. Brown, 221 F.3d at 334. Oneonta is a predominantly white town. Id.
Police compiled a list of black students in town and made random stops of non-
Whites, but came up with no suspects. [d. A class action §1983 suit was filed,
and several of the claims were dismissed on the premise that the men were nev-
er seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Id. at 335. On appeal,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissals for three of the men,
............... ~, .,._..- ,.~ -..,~-~ _.
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grabbed Terry to conduct the frisk as the moment of seizure,
the Court ignored the reality of citizen-police street encounters
and the need for judicial oversight under the Fourth Amend-
ment of such intrusions. But the Terry Court also ambivalently
wrote that "[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person.'?" However, later Supreme Court decisions seized on
that ambivalence and focused only on the physical seizure of
Terry, thus continuously narrowing those situations that are
subject to the reasonableness requirement.'" The effect has
been to eliminate very coercive police encounters from the
scope of the Fourth Amendment guarantee of reasonableness,
freeing the police on those occasions from all judicial oversight.
The Supreme Court developed the current standards in a
series of cases in contexts which are inherently stressful and
where government agents compounded that stress. Ironically,
there is more Fourth Amendment protection in an automobile
which is notoriously devoid of such protections because any
stop of a moving vehicle is a seizure subject to the reasonable-
ness standard. I'.A stop of a pedestrian is not as clear unless
the officer specifically commands or otherwise compels the
pedestrian to stop.!" and the reasonableness standard does
but upheld the rest because appellants failed to file affidavits. Id.
1M Terry I 392 U.S. at 16.
15S See United States v, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); see also California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). A police officer gave chase to a defendant
who took flight at the sight of the officer. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623. During the
chase, the defendant discarded a rock of cocaine. Id. The Court held that the evi-
dence was not a fruit of seizure because no physical force was applied before the
evidence was dropped and even if the chase was considered a "show of authority,"
a seizure did not occur when the defendant had not yielded. [d.
156 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U,S. 648, 653 (1979) ("lS]topping an automo-
bile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of those
Amendments."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543. 556-58 (1976);
Unites States v. Brigncni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 876 (1975).
is Michigan v. Chesterout, 486 U.S. 567 (19S8).
[T]he police conduct .. , would not have communicated to the reasonable
person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent's
freedom of movement. The record does not reflect that the police activated
a siren or flashers; or that they commanded respondent to halt.
Iw]hile the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pe-
destrian could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of police presence does
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not come into play until the suspect actually heeds the com-
mand.l'"
A. Airport Concourses
United States u. Mendenhall. This line of cases began with
United States u. Mendenhall, where the United States Supreme
Court could not agree when a Fourth Amendment seizure that
would have activated the reasonableness test had taken
place.l'" Mendenhall arose when a woman disembarking from
an airplane in Detroit aroused the suspicions of Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEAl agents present at the airport for the pur-
pose of detecting unlawful trafficking in narcotics. 160 The
agents approached the woman because it appeared to them
that her conduct was characteristic of persons unlawfully car-
rying narcotics.'!' She arrived on a plane from Los Angeles;
not, standing alone, constitute a seizure."
Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
158 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 ("The narrow question before us is whether,
with respect to show of authority as with respect to application of physical force,
a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does
not."),
tss Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544.
reo Id. at 547.
161 See Mark J. Kadish, The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes, Trains, and Auto-
mobiles; and Now in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (1997).
Police officers rely on drug courier profiles to justify stopping and
questioning citizens about whether they are carrying illegal drugs, A na-
tionally recognized profile does not exist; federal, state, local, and even
individual law enforcement officials may have their own "profile." Citizens
easily may match one of these profiles, because the profiles list general
and often contradictory characteristics: traveling by plane, train, automo-
bile, or bus; traveling alone, with friends, or with your children; being
young, middle-aged, or "older"; having short or long hair; traveling to or
from Fort Lauderdale, Miami, New York, Los Angeles, San Diego, Atlan-
ta, Chicago, Detroit, Austin, Birmingham, Chattanooga, Charlotte, Dayton,
Indianapolis, Kansas City, Newark, Tulsa, Dallas-Fort Worth, or any for-
eign country; traveling in a business suit, casual clothes, or disheveled
clothing; paying cash for yOUT ticket; traveling without checking your
luggage, carrying only a garment bag, or checking several large suitcases;
traveling and returning home in twenty-four to forty-eight hours; being
nervous or anxious when traveling; glancing around the airport, bus, or
train terminal; looking over your shoulder; making telephone calls imme-
diately after arriving at your destination; and taking public transportation
....: ...,......~.---..,- ......·· ·.·........- t .........: .........,......,....,. ......~ ~ .. ~- ... ~.'
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she disembarked from the plane last and appeared nervous as
she scanned the airport; she claimed no luggage; and she
changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.!" The agents
approached her and asked to see her identification and airline
ticket.!'" The names on the ticket and driver's license were
different, and Ms. Mendenhall indicated that she had been in
California just two days. I.' When the officers identified them-
selves as federal narcotics agents, Ms. Mendenhall appeared
shaken and nervous. I.' The agents returned her ticket and
license and asked her to accompany them to the airport DEA
office for further questioning. Iss Eventually, at the airport se-
curity office,Mendenhall turned over the narcotics she was car-
rying in her underclothing when the agents made it clear that
she could not leave until she was searched. '.7
The admissibility of that evidence ultimately hinged on the
nature of her presence in the security office. If Mendenhall's
encounter with the DEA agents in the airport concourse and
her trip to the security office constituted a forcible stop, it
would have to meet the Terry standards for a lawful seizure.
The factors that aroused the agents' suspicion turned on the
"drug courier profile,"'·· an informal compilation of character-
to your destination.
Id. at 748-49 (footnotes omitted).
'"' Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548 n.1.
163 See Robert J. Burnett, Random Police-Citizen Encounters: When is a Seizure
a Seizure? 33 DUQ. L. REV. 283 (1995).
Many airport vice details throughout the United States utilize Walk
and Talk drug interdiction programs (t4Walk and Talk Programs") in order
to approach and arrest airport travelers suspected of drug trafficking.
These Walk and Talk Programs do not employ any type of drug courier
profile and do not require the officers to have a reasonable suspicion that
a person is engaged in criminal activity. Instead, the officers randomly
approach individuals and ask them potentially incriminating questions
about their travel plans and the contents of their luggage. The program
is designed to elicit incriminating responses which ultimately may provide
the officer with sufficient grounds to detain the passenger further.
Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted).
,~ Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 548.
165 Id.
166 Id.
ie Id. at 549, 559.
168 Id. at 548 n.l.
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istics believed to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying nar-
cotics,which in the same term as Mendenhall was described by
the Court as "too slender a reed" on which to support a sei-
zure.!" If, on the other hand, there was no forcible stop and
seizure of Ms. Mendenhall, the reasonableness of the agents'
conduct would not be open to question.'?" The Supreme Court
could not agree.
Two Justices, Stewart and Rehnquist, took the position
that no seizure occurred because a reasonable person would
have believed that she was free to ignore the agents' questions
and requests and walk away.": The two Justices explained
that a seizure could be recognized, even when the person does
not attempt to leave, by the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled.'" Absent these indicia, the two Justices contend-
ed, "inoffensive conduct" between an individual and the police
cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure.!" Justice
Stewart was impressed by the fact that the agents returned
Mendenhall's driver's license and airline ticket before re-
questing that she accompany them to the security office.!"
Consequently, even though Mendenhall may not, herself, have
believed that she was free to ignore the agents, Justices Stew-
art and Rehnquist concluded that she had no objective reason
'" Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.s. 438, 440-41 (1980) (concluding that fitting the
characteristics of a "drug courier profile" in and of itself is insufficient to justify
detention). But see United States v, Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (providing
more leeway with drug courier profiles the Court explained, "[a] Court sitting to
determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articu-
late the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be
set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary signifi-
cance as seen by a trained agent").
ric Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552.
11l Id. at 544 ("We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.").
mId.
113 Id. at 555.
174 ld.
""':'tIf'" ... ·~'-""'····"·""".·- •• t ........ ,~...., ...~............,.. ,~ ....
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to believe that she could not end the conversation in the con-
course and proceed on her way.!"
Acceptance of the Stewart-Rehnquist formulation would
have drastic consequences because it labels as consensual al-
most all police-citizen encounters that are not arrests and plac-
es them outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment and
immune from review.l7O This formulation states that, as a
matter of law, most encounters between citizens and police are
consensual and purports to adopt objective criteria to deter-
mine this issue. At the outset, this is a view of the world which
is inconsistent with how most people untrained in law would
see the situation. Few would believe they are free to ignore an
officer's requests for information and cooperation."? Someone
mId.
'" See Commonwealth v. Lidge, 582 A.2d 383, 384-85, 387 (Pa. 1990). The offi-
cers apprehended a woman in an airport because she fit a drug courier's profile.
Lidge, 582 A.2d at 363-65. They sat on both sides of her, questioned her, and
having received consent, searched her bags. Id. at 364-65. The court held that
"appellant was not detained in any manner. She engaged in a consensual conver-
sation in a public place with the police officers." Id. at 368; see also People v.
Johoson, 865 P.2d 836, 837-38, 843 (Colo. 1994). The appellate court reversed the
district court's decision to suppress evidence. Johnson, 865 P.2d at 837. Officers
apprehended defendant after they saw him jogging to a payphone in an airport.
Id. at 837-38. The officers asked him several questions, checked his identification
and ticket and, with permission, searched his bag. Id. at 838. The officers found
six ounces of cocaine. Id. The court held that because the officers used a conver-
sational tone, did not display a weapon, and held the defendant for only a few
minutes, the defendant had not been seized. ld.
117 See Daniel J. Steinbrock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint:
The Unreality, Obscurity and Incliuity of the Fourth Amendment Consensual En-
counter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507 (2001).
The doctrine of consensual encounters, as established by the Supreme
Court and administered by the lower courts, is by and large a fictional
construct, exempting from the coverage of the Fourth Amendment signif-
icant interferences with personal liberty. The Supreme Court's doctrine is
flawed in conception by its use of the reasonable person standard, and its
picture of a reasonable person is simply out of touch with societal reality.
Briefly put, most people have neither the knowledge nor the fortitude to
terminate unwanted interactions with the police.
Id. at 521-22; see also Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391 (2003).
Consider also the Court's suspect holding that brief police-citizen
encounters on the street and on public transportation are 'consensual,'
despite the fact that such encounters are often tense even when the cit-
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izen is innocent. That holding is much more likely to affect the poor, who
spend relatively more of their time on the street. Similarly, living in a
high crime (poor) neighborhood, while not sufficient in itself to give police
reasonable suspicion to stop individuals, can authorize detention on rel-
atively little else, such as when the person runs from the police, despite
the fact that many poor people, especially African-American ones in cer-
tain urban areas, do not want to deal with the police even when innocent
of any cri~e.
[d. at 405 (footnotes omitted); see also Maclin, supra note 112.
In the unrealistic world of Mendenhall, the average citizen feels free
to ignore a police officer who has approached her. In this abstract world,
it is irrelevant whether the citizen is aware of her right to ignore the
officer. In the real world, however, few people are aware of their [FJourth
[A)rnendment rights, many individuals are fearful of the police, and police
officers know how to exploit this fear. If Mendenhall had dealt with the
issue candidly, it would have acknowledged that the average person does
not feel free to leave a police encounter. If a person is unlikely to ignore
an officer's approach, and is equally unlikely to know of her right to
depart, is the Court really serious in believing that the average person
will exercise her right to do so?
Realistically, the Justices probably do not believe that the typical
police-citizen encounter is the equivalent of two old friends greeting each
other on the street corner. Professor Kamisar has given a more plausible
explanation for the Mendenhall standard. He observed that the standard
is actually a "policy decision that the police should be allowed to rely on
the moral and instinctive pressure to cooperate inherent in [police-citizen]
encounters by not treating them as "seizures" for Fourth Amendment
purposes.
[d. at 1300-01 (footnotes omitted); Burnett, supra note 163.
The application of the Mendenhall/Royer test has unfortunately ere-
ated a vast category of police-citizen encounters which fall outside the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment. In reality, most citizens do not feel
free to end an encounter with police when randomly approached in an
airport terminal or other similar public venues. Despite the obvious re-
straint on liberty, these police-citizen encounters fall outside the Fourth
Amendment and are regrettably characterized as mere encounters or
nonseizures because, in the Supreme Court's view, a reasonable person
would feel free to end the encounter and walk away. As long as the Po-
lice officer is polite, non-accusatory and calm, a court applying
Mendenhall /Royer will readily find that a reasonable person would have
felt free to leave or disengage the encounter. Accordingly, no seizure has
occurred and the police have not triggered the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. More importantly, police using such consensual tactics do not
need justification for the initial questioning and can approach and interro-
gate anyone as long as they do not cross the magical threshold.
Herein lies the problem. If the citizen refuses to reply or walks
away, the authorities will deem such refusal to cooperate as justification
.&.0.... , ......... _ ............ •• .. •• .. ·.·-..·-..t ........______
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in Mendenhall's situation complies with the request because
she believes that she must. This is true in airports and on
inner city streets. Absent some hesitation on the part of an
individual in Mendenhall's situation, we are unlikely to see po-
lice react in a way that wouldhave proved to Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist that Mendenhall was not free to ignore the
agents' requests. Justice Stewart maintained that no Fourth
Amendment interest would be served by inquiring into the
reasonableness of the agents' behavior. It seems that the prop-
er question is the opposite of the one Stewart asked: whether
any legitimate interest is served by not evaluating police con-
duct of this sort by the reasonableness-balancingtest advanced
in Terry.
The other six Justices disagreed with the extreme Stewart-
Rehnquist analysis and concluded that a Terry seizure had
taken place. Even so, they split down the middle: Burger,
Powell and Blackmun concurred with Stewart and Rehnquist
on the ground that the seizure was justified by reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.178 The three dissent-
ing Justices, Brennan, White and Marshall, argued that Ms.
Mendenhall's conduct was insufficient to provide reasonable
suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity and that
for a prolonged detention. Conversely. if the citizen answers the initial,
generalized questions and no suspicion or criminality is exposed, the offi-
cer will often escalate the encounter by asking the individual if he would
consent to a luggage or body search. In either scenario, the intrusion is
escalated without justification.
ld. at 287-88 (emphasis added); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Two Hundred Years of
Individual Liberties: Essays on the Bill of Rights: Pinguitudinoue Police, Pachyder-
matous Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures'T, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729
(1991).
[M]endenhall-Royer is not merely a "reasonable person" test, nor even a
"reasonable innocent person" test, but rather a "reasonable innocent
pachydermatous person" test, for the Court finds a perceived freedom to
depart in circumstances when only the most thick-skinned of suspects
would think such a choice was open to them.
/d. at 739-40~ see also Michelle R. Ghetti, Seizure Through the Looking Glass: Con-
stitutional Analysis in Alice's Wonderland, 22 S.U. L. REV. 231 (1995) (providing a
creative analysis comparing Fourth Amendment consensual encounter jurisprudence
to the fictional world portrayed in Alice's Wonderland).
178 Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the agents' treatment of her was indistinguishable from a tra-
ditional arrest.!" The majority forged in Mendenhall results
from the joining of two Justices who did not believe that the
defendant had been seized, and three justices who did believe
that she was seized but that the seizure was reasonable. While
this type of fragmentation offers little guidance, it is a clear
indication that a narrow majority of the Court was prepared to
allow the police substantial latitude in the absence of physical
contact or removal to the policestation.
Florida v. Royer. In 1983, again in a case involving the
stopping of a suspected drug courier, the Court attempted to
clarify the position advanced in Mendenhall. While the Court in
Florida v. Royer'" remained unable to put together a majori-
ty opinion, by combining the plurality's positions with some of
those offered by Justice Brennan (who provided the fifth vote)
and still others put forward by the four dissenters, several
propositions emerged that were supported by a majority of the
Supreme Court. Eight Justices were in agreement that the
police officer who approached a suspected drug courier at an
airport concourse did not violate the Fourth Amendment by
that approach and request for identification becauseit was not
a seizure activating the Terry reasonableness test requiring ob-
jective justification for the intrusion.l" Four of those Justices,
however, alongwith Justice Brennan, took the position that the
consensual aspects of the encounter evaporated" when police
'" [d. at 572-74 (White, J., dissenting).
'''' 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
181 Royer, 460 U.S. at 502.
'" [d. at 503; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
Although we have yet to rule directly on whether mere questioning of an
individual by a police official, without more, can amount to a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, our recent decision in Royer, _ .. plainly
implies that interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identi-
fication by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure. In Royer, when Drug Enforcement Administration agents found
that the respondent matched a drug courier profile, the agents approached
the defendant and asked him for his airplane ticket and driver's license,
which the agents then examined. A majority of the Court believed that
the request and examination of the documents were "permissible in them-
selves,"
[d. at 216 (emphasis added).
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escorted the suspect to the police interrogation room at the
airport while the officers retained his ticket and identification,
removed his luggage to the interrogation room and did not in-
form him that he was free to leave. The Justices concluded that
"[als a practical matter, Royer was under arrest"!" and that
it was reasonable for him to believe that he was being de-
tained. The plurality asserted that there "were adequate
grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for tem-
porarily detaining him and his luggage while they attempted to
verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not ex-
ceed the limits of an investigative detention.'?"
The critical difference between Mendenhall and Royer'"
1&3 Royer, 460 U.s. at 503.
184 Id. at 502. Implicit in the plurality's statement is that seizing luggage
during an investigatory stop is not a violation of Fourth Amendment protection so
long as the police have reasonable suspicion. But see id. at 509-10 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
{Mlost of the plurality's discussion of the permissible scope of Terry in-
vestigative stops is also unnecessary to the decision.
The scope of a Terry-type "investigative" stop and any attendant
search must be extremely limited or the Terry exception would "swallow
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures [and searches} are
"reasonable" only if based on probable cause."
[d. at 509-10 (quoting Dunaway v, New York. 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)); see also
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (Brennan, J.. concurring).
In some respects the Court's opinion in this case can be seen as the
logical successor of the plurality opinion in Florida v. Royer. , .. {T]he
Court today goes well beyond in endorsing the notion that the principles
of Terry permit "warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custo-
dy of the owner on the basis of less than probable cause, for the purpose
of pursuing a limited course of investigation, short of opening the lug-
gage, that would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities' suspicion." .
(T]his suggestion finds no support in Terry or its progeny and significant-
ly dilutes the Fourth Amendment's protections against government inter-
ference with personal property.
Place, 462 U.S. at 714-15 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
res See Edwin J. Butterfloss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in
Determining When Fourth Amendment Actiuity Begins, 79 J, CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 437 (1988).
The divergent results, despite similar facts, of the two Supreme
Court cases that formulated the Mendenhall-Royer test are indicative of
the difficulty in applying the test. The only factual difference between the
two cases at the point the plurality found Royer was seized was the re-
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was that the officers in Royer kept the defendant's ticket and
idsntification.!" According to the plurality, Royer quickly
changed into an illegal arrest because the officers had posses-
sion of his ticket and identification as well as his luggage and,
as a practical matter, the suspect could not leave the airport
without thom.!" Moreover, the suspect was not informed that
he need not consent to a search of his luggage, which the plu-
rality felt was very significant even though that type of warn-
ing is not generally a prerequisite to a valid consensual
search.l'" Obviously, the retention of the travel documents in
Royer was essential to the plurality's conclusion that a consen-
sual encounter had been transformed into a Terry-type seizure
and then an arrest.'!" Such a show of authority is sufficient to
justify a reasonable belief that the individual who is stopped is
not free to leave .190
tention of Royer's airline ticket and identification. Yet the results are
vastly different. Justice Stewart did not even fmd that Mendenhall had
been seized during her ordeal, while the plurality found that Royer was
not only seized, but also arrested. Moreover, in finding a seizure of Royer,
the plurality pointed to facts that also were present in Mendenhall. The
Court's cases following Mendenhall and Royer provide no further elucida-
tion.
[d. at 451 (footnotes omitted).
tee Royer, 460 U.S. at 503 n.9.
18'1 [d.
i88 Id.
189 The Court was unable to put together a majority that agreed on whether
retention of identification constituted a seizure in Royer. Subsequent courts have
only further complicated the matter. Compare McLellan v, Commonwealth, 554
S.E.2d. 699, 701 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that "an officer's subjective evalua-
tion of the situation is not binding" on the court) with Piggott v. Commonwealth,
537 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a passenger in a car was
seized when the officer retained his ID the court stated, "[Tjhe consensual aspect
of the encounter ceased when Detective Langford retained Piggott's identification
while he ran a warrant check. A reasonable person in Piggott's circumstances
would not have believed that he could terminate the encounter and walk away.").
190 See Burnett, supra note 163.
The Mendenhall/Royer analysis is clearly insufficient. The current
application of the test is incompatible with the mandate of Terry. In Ter-
ry, the Supreme Court specifically warned of the danger of isolating the
initial stages of police-citizen encounters from constitutional safeguards.
The Court feared that the removal of judicial scrutiny would eliminate
the only effective deterrent to police misconduct. The Court's solemn con-
cern has flourished Wider Mendenhall! Royer. Many of the encounters
"'''1'''' -....-...,..- '-.-.,-. -.~ .........._.....-.~ ....
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Florida v. Rodriguez. The line between consensual encoun-
ters that raise no Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiries
and Terry-stops that must be supported by reasonable suspi-
cion remains undrawn. Following Mendenhall and Royer, the
Court, in Florida v. Rodriguez.i" was faced with yet another
case involving an airport encounter between police officers and
suspected drug couriers. Three travelers who aroused police
suspicion specifically tried to avoid contact with the police
officers, and the defendant, who unsuccessfully attempted to
avoid confronting the officers by going the wrong way on an
escalator, directed profanity at the officers.?" The officer "sug-
gested" that the defendant step aside about fifteen feet, which
initiated by police now fall outside the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. The absence of the Fourth Amendment protection encourages
the absolutely random detention of innocent citizens.
[d. at 305-06 (footnotes omitted); see also Butterfoss, supra note 185.
[Lliteral application of the Mendenhall-Royer "free-to-leave" test would
result in virtually all police-citizen encounters being characterized as sei-
zures and thereby eliminate the "non-seizure" category of such encounters.
Nevertheless, the test has not been applied-nor was it intended to
be applied-in such a manner. Rather, as stated above, precisely the
opposite has occurred. Application of the test has created a broad
"nonseisure" category of police-citizen encounters that permits officers
substantial leeway in approaching and questioning citizens without being
required to show objective justification for such conduct. This has been
accomplished both by constructing a highly artificial "reasonable person,"
who is much more assertive in encounters with police officers than is the
average citizen, and by ignoring the subjective intentions of the officer.
The result is that [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of citizens are determined
through a legal fiction, In many encounters with citizens, police conduct is
not scrutinized under the [F]ourth [A]mendment because in the courts'
view a reasonable person would feel free to end the encounter and walk
away. However, given the reality that citizens virtually never feel free to
walk away from an encounter initiated by a police officer, most of the cit-
izens in these "nonseizure" encounters do not feel free to walk away.
Moreover, in a significant number of these "nonseizure" cases, the police
officers involved testified that the citizen in fact was not free to leave.
The result is that citizens do not feel free to end encounters with police
and who, in fact, would not be permitted to do so, are left outside the
scope of the [Fjourth (Almendment protections because the reasonable
person constructed by the courts would have felt free to leave.
Id. at 439·40 (footnotes omitted).
'" 469 U. S. 1 (1984) (per curiam).
192 Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 3-4.
2004] TERRY v. OHIO AT THIRTY-FIVE 473
he did.'·' The officer then requested and was granted permis-
sion to search the defendant's suitcase.!'" Three bags of co-
caine were found during the search.!" The officer testified at
the suppression hearing that until the cocaine was found, the
three were free to leave. '.6
The Supreme Court held that the initial encounter between
the defendant and the police officers, "where they simply asked
if he would step aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort
of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment
interests."?" The Court's analysis was disingenuous. A con-
sensual encounter is one that implies that the individual is free
to avoid the encounter altogether or to tenninate it at will. In
each of the three airport encounter cases, the defendants com-
plied with persistent police requests. In Rodriguez, the
defendant's behavior clearly indicated an intention to avoid the
police but an inability to do so. It is difficult to conclude that
anyone in the defendant's position, after manifesting his intent
to avoid the confrontation, would reasonably believe that he
need not step aside and talk with police officers. Moreover, the
Court refused to characterize the additional intrusion when the
defendant was asked to move fifteen feet out of the traffic on
the concourse as a Terry_stop.l.8
B. Close Encounters
INS v. Delgado. The definition of seizure became more
opaque in several cases involving questioning in close spaces.
In INS v. Delgado, Immigration and Naturalization Service
agents conducted surveys of the work force at several factories
in search of illegal aliens. 1•• Each survey lasted more than an
hour.'oo Agents positioned themselves near the factory exits to
make sure than none of the employees left without being ques-




111'7 [d. at 5.
198 See id. at 5.
is INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 211·12 (1984).
zooDelgado, 466 U.S. at 214.
......1tt •.• _~ .,.....-~..... , ••, .. _. __ ,......... ,~ .... ~.~ .... ~_.
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tioned."" Other agents circulated through the work area ask-
ing each employee questions relating to the employee's citizen-
ship and status in the United States.?" During the question-
ing, the employees were permitted to continue working and
were free to circulate on the work floor, provided that no one
attempted to leave before being questioned.i" "The agents
displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies and were armed," but
no agent drew a weapon during the surveys.i"
Drawing from the airport cases, Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, appeared to adopt a bright-line rule.
[Plolicequestioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth
Amendment violation. . . . Unless the circumstances of the
encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a rea-
sonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if
he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning
resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But if
the person refuses to answer and the police take additional
steps-such as those taken in Brown20'-to obtain an an-
swer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal
level of objective justification to validate the detention or sei-
zure.206
The Court rejected the claim that the entire work force had
been seized.?" The Court said that the inability of the work-
ers to leave was part of the ordinary arrangement between
employers and workers: "Ordinarily, when people are at work
their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted,
~Gl [d. at 212.
~G2 [d.
203 [d. at 213.
~ [d. at 212.
205 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Officers observed the defendant walk-
ing in a "high drug problem area," and although he was not engaged in any
criminal activity and there was no reason to believe that he was carrying a
weapon, the officers stopped him and asked for identification. Brown, 443 U.S. at
49. When the defendant refused, the officers frisked him, found nothing, yet ar-
rested him for violation of a "stop and identify" statute. [d. The Court held the
defendant was unreasonably seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
[d. at 52.
aoe Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17.
201 Id: at 218.
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not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the
workers' voluntary obligations to their employers.?" Even
though some workers tried to hide from the agents, the Court
concluded that the presence of agents at the doors did not ele-
vate the encounter to a Fourth Amendment seizure.""
Respondents argue, however, that the stationing of
agents near the factory doors showed the INS's intent to pre-
vent people from leaving. But there is nothing in the record
indicating that this is what the agents at the doors actually
did. The obvious purpose of the agents' presence at the factory
doors was to insure that all persons in the factories were
questioned. The record indicates that the INS agents' conduct
in this case consisted simply of questioning employees and
arresting those they had probable cause to believe were un-
lawfully present in the factory. This conduct should have giv-
en respondents no reason to believe that they would be de-.
tained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to
them or if they simply refused to answer. If mere questioning
does not constitute a seizure when it occurs inside the factory,
it is no more a seizure when it occurs at the exits."?
Having found that the employees were not seized, the Court
incredibly concluded that the respondents also were free not to
cooperate."!
Justice Brennan dissented and accused the Court ofmisap-




211 Id. at 220~21.
While persons who attempted to flee or evade the agents may eventually
have been detained for questioning, respondents did not do 80 and were
not, in fact, detained. The manner in which respondents were questioned,
given its obvious purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that
respondents were not free to continue working or to move about the facto-
ry. Respondents may only litigate what happened to them, and our review
of their description of the encounters with the INS agents satisfies us
that the encounters were classic consensual encounters rather than Fourth
Amendment seizures.
[d. (citations omitted),
mId. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 554).
L· ,, -.-.-. .., _ ..__ ., ..,_, ...................-:-------....-. .. .
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not a reasonable person would, believe that he is free during
the course of the questioning to disregard the questions and
walk away, Justice Brennan concluded:
Although none of the respondents was physically restrained
by the INS agents during the questioning, it is nonetheless
plain beyond cavil that the manner in which the INS conduct-
ed these surveys demonstrated a "show of authority" of suffi-
cient size and force to overbear the will of any reasonable
person, Faced with such tactics, a reasonable person could not
help but feel compelled to stop and provide answers to the
INS agents' questions.i"
The Delgado majority's reasoning is absurd. Justice
Rehnquist's reference to the consensual nature of an encounter
when citizens are asked questions by police ignores the very
nature of the group questioned in Delgado and the desperate
situation faced by undocumented aliens." To conclude that
these workers were free to refuse to cooperate with the INS
[Justice Stewart's] opinion also suggested that such circumstances might
include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen,
or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with
the officer's request might be compelled."
A majority of the Court has since adopted that formula as the appro-
priate standard for determining when inquiries made by the police cross
the boundary separating merely consensual encounters from forcible stops
to investigate a suspected crime.
ld. (citations omitted).
ZlJ Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214 See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L.
REV, 946 (2002),
While Justice Rehnquist may want us to believe (or may himself think)
that he is applying a race neutral standard, in fact he is not. To begin
with, the "any reasonable person" category presumably includes
Latinaslos. Latinaslos and non-Latinas/os, however, are likely to perceive
the INS in different ways. Whether or not Latinaslos are documented,
they are, on the whole, more likely than non-Latinaslos to be apprehen-
sive about encounters with the INS. Given the difference between how
Latinaslos and non-Latinaslos are likely to respond to INS authority,
Justice Rehnquist's unmodified reasonable-person approach is fictional.
Specifically, it creates the misimpression that there is a neutral identity
position from which to ask the seizure question.
Id. at 995-96 (footnotes omitted).
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agents is outrageous because it ignores the facts of the case.
Further, Justice Rehnquist dismisses the workers' claim that
the INS agents prevented them from leaving on the theory that
the work rules prevented them from leaving. However, the fact
was that INS agents prevented the workers from leaving until
they answered the INS agents' questions.
Working the Buses. In Florida v. Bostick,215 police en-
gaged in a practice called ''working the buses," where they
boarded buses shortly before departure and asked some or all
of the passengers, without individualized suspicion, for infor-
mation about themselves, their destination, and for permission
to search their luggage for drugs.!" The Florida Supreme
Court found the encounter to be fraught with coercionbecause
the officers would stand over the individual questioned and
block the aisle which effectivelyprevented a person from leav-
ing'lI7Consequently, despite the trial court's finding of fact
that the officersinformed the defendant that he did not have to
consent to a search, the Florida high court characterized the
encounter as a seizure that was rendered unconstitutional be-
cause of the lack of individualized suspicion.'''
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing
that a seizure does not occurevery time an officerapproaches a
citizen in public and questions that person.?" The Court said
that if the encounter had taken place inside the bus terminal
or before the passenger boarded the bus, it would not have
risen to the level of a seizure.''' The fact that the encounter
took place in the cramped confines of a bus did not render the
situation qualitatively different. The Court stated that "the
mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus does
not mean that the police seized him."'21Rather, the compul-
sion to remain rather than depart was the result of something
other than the conduct of the law enforcement officers, accord-
ai 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
sre Bostick, 501 U.S. at 433.
217 ld.
218 Id. at 434.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 [d. at 436.
It.,... ,........ -..-~._, .....~.... ' ....... -. •• _•...-,~~._.~ ,--......--.-.-.--.. ... " ~_.
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ing to the Court!" Instead, the right question, the majority
wrote, is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline
the police request to search and otherwise terminate the en-
counter.i"
The Supreme Court ignored the fact that most persons
riding interstate buses have far less influence and economic
and political power than airplane passengers!" Bus passen-
gers are less likely to feel free to refuse a police request and
more likely to believe that a police request is an order, regard-
less of the actual words used to make the request, an impres-
sion that is heightened by the physical dominance of the officer
blocking the aisle and standing over the seated passenger.f"
The political consequences of such behavior on an airplane
would be far different from the consequences when the target is
a bus.
It is inconceivable that police would "sweep the planes" for
drugs, regularly delaying departures while police officers on the
plane asked to see identification and tickets and requested




m See Slobogin, supra note 177, at 406 t''Relatlve wealth makes a difference
in search and seizure. . [T]here are fairly robust indications that the Court's
caselaw affords the poorer people in our country much less protection of their
privacy and autonomy than those who are better off.").
225 See LaFave, supra note 177.
Even if it is generally true that police encounters with pedestrians, in-
eluding travelers who become ensnared in drug courier detection activities
at airports, are not seizures, the confrontations which occur on buses as a
part of suspicionless police sweeps nonetheless ought to be deemed sei-
zures because they are dramatically different in terms of the character of
the police activity involved and its impact upon the reasonable traveler.
This difference, essentially, comes down to these two propositions: (0 the
police dominance of the situation manifested by their sweep activity, un-
dertaken with the obvious connivance of the common carrier to which bus
travelers have entrusted their care, is highly coercive because it is so un-
like any contact which might occur between two private citizens, (ii I that
dominance has a uniquely heavy impact upon bus travelers precisely
because they do not, as a practical matter, have available the range of
avoidance options which pedestrians and airport travelers might utilize.
Ld. at 746-47.
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By consciouslydeciding to single out persons who have under-
taken interstate or intrastate travel, officers who conduct
suspicionless, dragnet-style sweeps put passengers to the
choiceof cooperating or of attempting to exit their buses and
possibly being stranded in unfamiliar locations. It is exactly
because this "choice"is no "choice"at all that policeengage in
this technique.f"
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in United States v.
Dray ton ,227 which presented significantly different facts from
the earlier case. In Drayton, three police officers boarded an
interstate bus at a rest stop just prior to the bus's depar-
ture.228 One officer moved to the back of the bus; the second
stayed in the front by the exit; and the third officer, Lang,
worked his way from rear to front speaking with the passen-
gers and asking permission to search their luggage and per-
sons.f" Officer Lang did not advise the passengers that they
could refuse permission, unlike the investigators in Boetichi"
The defendant was traveling with another man."" When the
officer came up to Drayton and his companion, he told them
they were looking for drugs and weapons!" He asked if they
had any luggage, and both men pointed to the suitcase in the
overhead luggage rack.''' Lang asked if he could check; a
search of the bag revealed no contraband. aa Then Lang asked
Drayton's companion if he could check his person; the compan-
ion agreed.F" A pat-down revealed hard objects similar to
"drug packages" in both thigh areas.i" At that point, the com-
panion was arrested and removed from the bus.?" Officer
aa Bostick, 501 U.S. 450,
aa 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
as Drayton, 463 U.S. at 197,






235 [d. at 199.
236 Id.
23~ [d.
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Lang then asked Drayton if he could check him, and Drayton
agreed." The pat-down revealed similar objects as were
found on the companion, and Drayton was arrested?"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed the convictions, holding that passengers do not
feel free to disregard an officer's request for permission to
search unless they are given some positive indication that con-
sent may be refused.i" The United States Supreme Court re-
versed and rejected the Eleventh Circuit's bright-line rule that
evidence seized during suspicionless drug interdictions on bus-
es must be suppressed unless police advise passengers that
they have the right to refuse.?" The Court drew conclusions
opposite from those drawn by the Eleventh Circuit.
Applying the Bostick framework to the facts of this par-
ticular case, we conclude that the police did not seize respon-
dents when they boarded the bus and began questioning pas-
sengers. The officers gave the passengers no reason to believe
that they were required to answer the officers' questions.
When Officer Lang approached respondents, he did not bran-
dish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left
the aisle free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to
passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet voice. Nothing he
said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was
barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the
ancounter.F"
The Court concluded that such an encounter on the street
would have been consensual, and the fact that it takes place on
a bus does not convert it into an illegal seizure.?"
There was no application of force, no intimidating movement,
no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no
blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authori-
23& [d.
239 Id .
.., United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 790-91 (11th Cir. 2000); reo'd, 536
U.S 194 (2002).
w Drayton, 536 U.S. 202·03 .
.. , Id. at 203·04.
!4J ld. at 204.
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tative tone of voice. It is beyond question that had this en-
counter occurred on the street, it would be constitutional. The
fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does not on its
own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an
illegal seizure. Indeed, because many fellow passengers are
present to witness officers' conduct, a reasonable person may
feel even more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate
with police on a bus than in other circumstances. '"
Nor did the fact that the officer displayed his badge turn the
encounter into a seizure. Relying on Delgado, the majority said,
"[wlhile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact
that people do so, and do so without being told that they are
free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of
the response.'?" Further, the majority rejected the
defendant's claim that the arrest of his companion turned the
encounter into a seizure because no reasonable person would
then feel free to refuse cooperation.!" "If anything," the Court
said, "Brown's arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the
consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the
officers' questions. Even after arresting Brown, Lang addressed
Drayton in a polite manner and provided him with no indica-
t· th h . d L' ti "247Ion at e was require to answer ang s ques Ions.
It is very hard to imagine that either Brown (the traveling
companion) or Drayton would have believed that he stood to
lose nothing if he refused to cooperate with the police, or that
he had a choice to ignore the police altogether. No reasonable
passenger could have believed that, only an uncomprehending
one.
The sum of all these cases from Terry to Drayton is that
the government advocated (1) expanding police power to extend
to investigatory stops on less than probable cause and (2) nar-
rowing the definition of "stop" to exclude most citizen-police
encounters. In other words, state, local and federal govern-
ments sought extended power for police and, once that power
244 Id. (citations omitted).", [d. at 205 (quoting Delgado, 446 U.S. at 216).
'" [d. at 206.
2~1 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206.
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was granted, spent the next thirty years persuading the Court
to exclude most citizen-police encounters from the limits im-
posed on the extended powers, Only when an officer verbally
indicates that the citizen must stop or utilizes other forcible
means is the government put to its proof to show that there
was reasonable cause to justify the stop, The prosecution must
offer its proof only where a reasonable person would not feel
free to walk away and ignore the police officer's questions or,
where walking away is not at issue, to refuse the officer's re-
quest for cooperation. Terry opened the door for this outcome
by focusing on the moment that Officer McFadden grabbed
Terry and spun him around. The reality is that Terry and his
companions no longer had the liberty to ignore Officer
McFadden and walk away once McFadden walked up to them
outside the men's store, ordered them to keep their hands out
of their pockets, and asked their identities.
What is missing in all of these cases is an understanding
of the power differential between law enforcement agents and
citizens. The reasonable person, untrained in this area of the
law, simply does not believe that ignoring a police request is an
option." Unless trained in the law, people are not aware of
their rights in the context. Moreover, police officers exploit that
ignorance and create the impression that the person does not
have a choice. When a patrol car closely follows a pedestri-
an,"9 when a police officer persists in asking a person to stop
... State v. Baldwin, 686 So, 2d 682, 683-85 (Fla. Diet. Ct. App. 1996). The
police observed two men loitering in a high crime area. Baldwin, 686 So. 2d at
683. The police admitted that the two men were not engaging in any suspicious
activities, but approached the men nonetheless. [d. Defendant refused to be
searched, but did not leave the scene while police searched his friend. Id. The
officers repeatedly told the defendant to get his hands out of his pockets. Id. The
officers then saw defendant throw something to the ground, at which point they
physically detained him. Id. at 683-84. The court held that the officer requested,
not commanded, defendant to take his hands out of his pockets. ld. at 685. That
distinction kept the encounter from being an illegal detention. [d.
249 See generally Michigan v. Chasternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); see also Maclin,
supra note 112.
Chesternut reflects the current Court's unwillingness or inability to
empathize with those citizens who are subjected to police scrutiny. Is the
Court credible when it says that "people are not shorn of all Fourth
Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto public aide-
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and answer questions in an airline terminal when the traveler
has tried to ignore or evade the officer,250or when a law en-
forcement officer is blocking exits and leading some people
away,"" it is the height of folly to think people have a real
choice.252Moreover, during these encounters police officers
walks," but then holds that the police are free to chase individuals up
and down the streets, provided their actions are not "so intimidating"?
Perhaps the result in Chesternut is due to the fact that none of the Jus-
tices has been recently chased down public streets by a police car. After
Chesternut, if people want to feel secure on the streets, they had better
be track stars. The use of the right-to-inquire rule has undermined the
Court's ability to credibly define when a person has been seized. The
Court has expanded the rule to a point where a government's desire to
chase, stop, and question persons has become more important than the
citizen's right to come and go as he pleases.
[d. at 1307 (footnotes omitted).
250 See generally Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.s. 1 (l984) (per curiam); see also
Mendenhall, 446 LtB. at 544.
251 See generally Delgado, 466 U,S. 210; see also Drayton, 536 U.S. 194.
252 See Anderson, supra note 146.
In the consent jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court that related to
search and seizure matters, the logic of Schneckloth and Mendenhall ulti-
mately became the standard for evaluating the adequacy of consent. Thus,
since the law would rarely deny police the fruit of their aggressive inves-
tigations, the scales were tipped in their favor and they were thereby
encouraged to press hard to obtain consent even though their conduct
may well have been coercive to the average citizen. The Supreme Court's
lukewarm regard for protecting citizens from aggressive police efforts to
obtain consent to search during routine investigations created a severe ac-
countability vacuum that encouraged police abuse.
Id. at 741; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment:
The Police Chases, 58 TENN. L. REV. 73, 78-79 (1990).
The present Supreme Court, however, appears to have lost sight of
Terry's even-handed approach to the [F[ourth [A]mendment. While con-
tinuing to lessen the government's burden to establish the constitutional
reasonableness of its conduct, there has been no corresponding expansion
of the suspect's zone of protected privacy and liberty. Instead, the Court
has narrowed the coverage of the [Flourth [Almendment by holding that
more and more law enforcement activity is excluded from the definition of
search and seizure. This on-going contraction of the [AJmendment's scope
follows a pattern in which the facts of the particular case suggest that
the police cannot justify their actions as constitutionally reasonable, yet
the Court will conclude that the police conduct is a desirable part of the
war on crime. In such situations the police conduct can receive Court
approval only if it is placed beyond the coverage of the [F[curth
lAlmendment, thereby eliminating any requirement of constitutional rea-
'...;~.,' .....--"",-_ ...... - ...'_'.I ...."'\~ III-",~~ .. ~ .
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use words and gestures calculated to make citizens comply. The
emphasis is on compliance, not choice.
1 can well understand the compulsion that persons so ac-
costed feel. In January 1969, I attended an Association of
American Law Schools annual meeting in Detroit. At the time,
I was a young law professor in Cleveland, a naval reserve offi-
cer, a husband and father, and a veteran of the Terry case. 1
also had long hair and a beard. I decided to take a Greyhound
bus back to Cleveland. 1 bought my ticket and headed to the
bus when 1 was accosted by a federal agent. 1 do not remember
what agency, but it was early January during the height of the
Vietnam war. 1 surmised that he was looking for draft evaders
or deserters who had fled to Canada and were returning to the
states to see their families during the holidays. The agent de-
manded to see my identification and draft card which I refused
to show him. He persisted in a loud and angry manner until 1
walked around him and boarded the bus. Until the bus depart-
ed, the agent stood directly outside the window where 1 was
seated, glaring at me the entire time. I fully expected him to
board the bus and drag me off. He was bullying travelers into
cooperating and showing their identity cards. 1 knew he could
not legally compel me to cooperate, but-not knowing 1 was a
lawyer versed in the particular law-he was determined to per-
suade me that 1 had no choice in the matter. He glared at me
until the bus finally left. 1 had nothing to hide, but 1 thought I
had a duty to assert my rights because he was determined to
act as though I had none, a tactic which I am certain worked
over and over for him, just as it does now.
How unsettled I felt, knowing my rights but insecure won-
dering if the officer (1) knew my rights and (2) would honor
those rights. Now, when travelers succumb to an officer's per-
sistence comparable to that which I faced, I am sure that the
manner in which the encounter is portrayed at a suppression
sonableness. The result-oriented nature of the Court's approach allows it
to tailor the [A)mendment's coverage by covertly determining whether the
reasonableness requirement can be satisfied before deciding whether to
impose the requirement upon the police.
[d. at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).
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hearing leads a judge to conclude that a reasonable person
would have felt that he could just walk away. In other words,
the officer's manner on the street or in the terminal is very
different from how it is portrayed in the courtroom.
Transpose that situation to a street corner in an inner city
and change the citizen from a law professor to a young black
man.''' Does anyone really believe that that young man has a
choicewhen a police officerwalks up to him and starts asking
questions? If the young man refuses to answer or, worse, walks
away, he may well believe that his safety or life is in danger. It
is naive or duplicitous to say that the reasonable person would
believe that he is free to disregard the police officer and walk
away. It would be highly unreasonable for the young man to
think he could ignore the policeofficer's"request."254
PART V: REASONABLE SUSPICION
Not only has the Court excluded a significant portion of
citizen-police encounters from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, it
has categorically broadened policepower to make legal investi-
gatory stops. Even those cases where a Terry investigatory stop
as See, e.g., United States v. Ringold, 335 F,3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1026 (2003), Police observed defendant, a black male, driving
through Kansas with California plate, and followed him. Ringold; 335 F,3d at
1170. Defendant stopped at a gas station and the police followed, parked their
squad car in front of defendant's car and approached him while he pumped gas.
ld. The officers surrounded the defendant and told him he was suspected of
transporting drugs. [d. The police asked to search his vehicle, which defendant
consented to, and the police found marijuana. Id. Despite the fact that the police
followed the defendant, cut off his ability to leave the gas station, asked unfound-
ed questions about drugs, and never told him that he did not have to comply, the
Court cited United States v. Bostick and held that "the police conduct would [not]
have communicated to a reasonable person that 'the person was not free to de-
cline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." [d. at 1171-72.
254 See Laser, supra note 113.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed, however, the equally com-
pelling question of whether a person's refusal to consent to a search re-
quest during a noncoercive police encounter can constitute even a part of
the basis for a Terry stop or search, and lower courts are in disagreement
concerning this issue. One circuit permits police officers to use the
defendant's refusal to consent to a search request as one of the factors
constituting the "totality of circumstances," while other circuits do not.
t« at 1172.73.
� •• ,.< -...-...- - ••• , •.- ~ -~ ••• -- •• •
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turned the corner on to Euclid Avenue, nothing about their
behavior would continue to sustain a reasonable belief that
they were about to commit a crime.
It was never clear exactly what the Court was upholding
and what level of cause needed to be met, other than some-
thing less than probable cause. Nor did the companion cas-
es--Sibron v. New York'·3 and Peters v. New York'64-add
much clarification. In Sib ron, again, the Court focused on the
search for weapons, finding it unsupportable because the
officer's statement before the search for weapons "made it
abundantly clear that he sought narcotics," not a weapon.'6'
In Peters, the Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of
the New York statute, which authorized police to stop people
and search for dangerous weapons on "reasonable suspicion,"
by finding that the search was incident to a lawful arrest for
burglary based upon probable cause.'''
The reasonable suspicion standard became firmly estab-
lished a decade after Terry, in Brown v. Texas, when the Court
held that a police officer's claim that a man ''looked suspicious"
without accompanying facts which supported that conclusion
was insufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.t"
nothing to indicate abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at some
point."); see, e.g., State v. Cyr, 501 A.2d 1303 (Me. 1985). An officer saw a car
parked in the parking lot of a furniture store. Cyr, 501 A.2d at 1306. The officer
knew that the store had recently been burglarized, but chose not to approach
defendant. Id. The defendant drove away from the store, and the officer followed,
eventually electing to stop the car. [d. at 1305. The defendant was charged with
operating a motor vehicle without a license. ld. Even though defendant left the
suspicious scene, and was never shown to have any intent to burglarize the store,
the court held that "[g]iven the location of the truck, the time of night, and the
other surrounding circwnstance, we conclude that specific and articulable facts
existed to justify the minimal intrusion involved in stopping the vehicle." Id. at
1306.
163 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1967) (consolidated with Peters v. New
York).
264 Peters v, New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (consolidated with Sibron v, New
York).
26& Sibron, 392 U.S. 64 (consolidated with Peters v. New York).
266 Peters v. New York, 392 U,S, at 66 (consolidated with Sibron v. New York);
see also N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO., ch. 86, § 180-0 (1964) (current version at N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 140.50 (McKinney 2004)).
281 Brown v. 'I'exas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
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Thus, Justice Harlan's approach to the issue in Terry and de-
velopment of the reasonable suspicion standard took hold and
became the standard which we still use thirty five years lat-
er .268
The Terry doctrine, as applied in Terry and in subsequent
cases, has deprived persons in inner-city minority communities
of basic Fourth Amendment guarantees. Overwhelmingly,
youngblack men are the subjects of Terry stops and the formu-
lation and maturation of the reasonable suspicion standard
made that impact inevitable!"
268 Terry, 392 U.S, at 131-34 (Harlan, J" concurring), The only part of the
Harlan approach which has not become law was his view that once an officer has
reasonable suspicion to forcibly stop a suspect, the right to conduct a limited
search for weapons should flow automatically from the right to stop. Id. Instead,
the Court has maintained that the stop and the frisk are two separate inquiries,
although the right to search for weapons has been treated as almost automatic in
some lower courts, especially in drug cases. See, e.g., United States v. Sakyi, 160
F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting a per se rule allowing a Terry frisk fol-
lowing a stop supported by reasonable suspicion of drugs: "The indisputable nexus
between drugs and guns presumptively creates a reasonable suspicion of danger
to the officer.").
269 Cf. Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Mi-
nority Neighborhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Person:" 36 HOW. L.J. 239
(993).
While the Justices in Terry were conscious of the problems between
African Americans and police officers, they failed to provide adequate
safeguards to ensure that the relations between police and the African
American community would be considered when determining whether a
reasonable person would feel free to deny consent to a search and sei-
zure. The Court was presented with the opportunity to affirmatively incor-
porate the long history of police oppression into its formula to determine
voluntary consent to a search and seizure. Instead, the Supreme Court
chose not to do so, thus, perpetuating the social wrongs it knew occurred
almost daily.
In decisions following Terry, the Supreme Court has continued to ig·
ncre the historical relationship between minority communities and the
police.
[d. at 248-49 (footnotes omitted); cf Harris, supra note 29.
A substantial body of law now allows police officers to stop an individual
based on just two factors: presence in an area of high crime activity, and
evasive behavior. In other words, many courts now find that reasonable
suspicion to stop exists when the person involved 1) is in a crime-prone
location, and 2) moves away from the police.
Even if this does not seem remarkable in the abstract, these "loca-
tion plus evasion" cases become distressing when viewed in conjunction
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the officer's conclusions, it vests unlimited discretion in the
officer on the street, discretion which the Court has sought to
limit in other Fourth Amendment contexts.
The second problematic factor is the weight given to the
locale where the stop takes place. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the neighborhood where a suspect is found is
not enough, alone, to justify an investigatory stop!" In
Brown v. Texas, the Court said that "[appellant's being] in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a
basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in
criminal conduct.'?"
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has used locale as an
appropriate element in the Terry equation, and in one of the
earliest stop and frisk cases, Adams v. Williams, it appeared to
be the critical component:" In Illinois v. Wardlow, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote that "[a]n individual's presence" in a high
crime area "standing alone, is not enough to support a reason-
able, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a
crime" but immediately undermined that statement:
But officers are not required to ignore the relevant charac-
teristics of a location in determining whether the circum-
stances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further inves-'
tigation. Accordingly,we have previously noted the fact that
the stop occurred in a "high crime area" among the relevant
contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.'"
218 Subsequent courts have been as inconsistent as the Supreme Court on this
issue. See. e.g., United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. de-
nied, 540 U.S. 1135 (2004). An officer received a tip that two black men were
selling drugs. Burton, 334 F.3d at 515. He saw two black men in a car, stopped
the vehicle for being illegally parked, and questioned the men about narcotics. ld:
The court held that "where, as here, the traffic stop took place on a street known
to the police as a high-crime area, we believe that asking a few questions about
illegal activity to the driver of an automobile stopped for a traffic violation at
11:30 p.m. is not unreasonable." ld. at 519. But see United States v. Lawson, No.
92·3214, 1994 WL 9944 (D.C. CiL Jan. 3, 1994). Police officers surrounded a roan
in a wheelchair based on an anonymous tip and the fact that defendant was in a
high crime neighborhood. [d. at *1, The court found "these two factors alone in-
sufficient to justify the stop." Id. at "'10.
m Brown V. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979\
". Adams v, Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
279 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). (citations omitted).
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And the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie, while indicating
that "[e]ven in high crime areas where the possibility that any
given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires reason-
able, individualized suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be
conductedl.l'?" did indicate the importance of such a locale in
the reasonable suspicion analysis."! The clear message is
that in ''high crime" or "high drug activity" areas, i.e. the inner
city, the possibility of criminal activity is so substantial as to
make everyone in the area subject to police inquiry.
Consequently, lower courts give enormous weight to this
collateral factor, often requiring little more than some other
innocuous bits of information to fulfill the reasonable suspicion
requirement justifying a stop. Thus, "high crime area" becomes
a centerpiece of the Terry analysis, serving almost as a
talismanic signal justifying investigative stops. Location in
America, in this context, is a proxy for race or ethnicity.?" By
sanctioning investigative stops on little more than the area in
which the stop takes place, the phrase "high crime area" has
the effect of criminalizing race. It is as though a black man
standing on a street corner or sitting in a legally parked car
has become the equivalent to "driving while black" for motor-
ase Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990).
Ul Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
asa See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 nn.7-8.
[M)any minorities [believe] that field interrogations are conducted "india-
criminately" and "in an abusive. . manner" and Iabelll this phenomenon
a "principal problem" causing "friction" between minorities and the police.
Many stops never lead to an arrest, which further exacerbates the
perceptions of discrimination felt by racial minorities and people living in
high crime areas.
[d. at 132·33 IUl.7-8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); cf Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that stops
are not random and that race is a factor in determining who is stopped); United
States v, Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
By requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to such seizures, the
Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from being subjected to
"overbearing or harassing" police conduct carried. out solely on the basis of
imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of ir-
relevant personal characteristics such as race.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
...·~t····~K_"'-"'''''~"~~''''''''.''''''••••r-, ..................,~---.....- .......
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One of the best illustrations of both points, substituting a
police officer's expertise for an objective evaluation and sub-
stituting locale for facts, is an Ohio case, State v. Bobo,'''
where three officers from the Cleveland Police Department
Narcotics Unit, "in an unmarked police car, were investigating
an area of the city known for heavy drug activity."'8s The offi-
cers "noticed a car with two occupants legally parked on the
street near an open field."'·' The officers circled the block and
returned to the parked vehicle where, now, only one occupant
of the car was visible.i" One of the officers testified that
Marvin Bobo popped up on the passenger's side of the front
seat, looked at the police officers, and then disappeared once
again "as if to hide something under the front seat."'·· The
officers approached Bobo's vehicle on foot, asked him to step
out, and conducted a search.!" The officers found a weapon
under the front seat.290 Bobo was arrested and charged with
two weapons offenses.?" No drugs were found on Bobo, his
companion, or in the car.'92Bobo's motion to suppress the gun
and the police officers' testimony about the gun was denied by
the trial court, which then found the defendant guilty?" The
court of appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the
investigative stop was illegal because "'there were not
articulable facts to justify the officers' reasonable suspicion
that ... [BoboJwas engaged in criminal activity."?"
as State Y. Ward, 610 N.E.2d 579, 582 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (Harper J., dis-
senting) ("The majority of this court today, as has been the recent trend in this
court, is actually holding that, as a matter of law, those unfortunate black, His-
panic and poor white citizens who by virtue of their economic and social status
live in so-called 'high crime areas' are suspects.") (citations omitted).
'M 524 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988).
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The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appel-
late court, finding that the stop was reasonable.i" The court's
conclusion in Bobo rested on four factors: 1) "the area in which
Bobo was parked was an area noted for the number of drug
transactions which occurred there"; 2) "the stop was made at
approximately 11:20 p.m."; 3) "the circumstances surrounding
the stop must 'be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and
cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience
and training"'; and 4) "the officers' observation of Bobo popping
up and then ducking down or leaning forward.Y" It is in-
structive to note that the state argued that the arresting
officer's twenty years of experience "and numerous years in the
surveillance of drug and weapon activity" should weigh heavily
in the assessment of the facts."" After all, we are told that
the officer knew how drug transactions went down and knew
how to assess a suspect's "gesture. . . in ducking under his
seat.'''98 Notice was not taken that the usual drug transaction
is quick; the buyer and seller do not linger.!" The officers did
not see any other persons walking up to the car,"?' Moreover,
the officers were not in a police car. Persons parked in a high
drug area who see a vehicle with three men observing their
parked car coming around the block again and stopping behind
the parked car might well be frightened and prompted to move
around perhaps in preparation for pulling away from the curb
if they feel further threatened.
Bobo is indicative of how stops in the inner city are viewed
by reviewing courts. The critical factors cited by the court were
the area where Bobo was parked, the time of day, and the
experience of the officers; everything else was terribly ambigu-
ous. Arguably, area and time of day are not meant to be the
foundation upon which a stop is made. Yet Bobo stands for the
proposition that every person coming and going at night on an
urban street in a "high crime" or "high drug activity" locale is
'"' Id.
'" Id. at 491-92.
'" Id. at 491.
'"' Id. at 490.". Id.'00 Id.
"""..,~, ~J_'" ' ,•....-'..............-__--_.- ....--,.,....--,..,-,....-._--,.-.....- ... ~- . ~ ....
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subject to being stopped, questioned, and possibly searched.?"
Although Terry held that an officer'sexperience requires her to
draw inferences from facts, not to draw conclusions from noth-
ing, in Bobo it was merely a ubiquitous claim of furtive ges-
tures that sealed the case.'02Such outcomes could not have
ac See, e.g., United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). An of-
ficer with 14 years of experience working in the neighborhood approached a de-
fendant because his car was parked in a school zone. Edmonds, 240 F.3d at 57.
His suspicion was based on location since the area was notorious for drug activ-
ity. [d. He approached the defendant, asked him for identification and to step out
of the car. Id. The defendant fled the scene. Id. The court held that defendant
was seized when the officer asked him for identification, but held that the seizure
was reasonable based on the officer's experience and location of the defendant's
vehicle. Id. at 64. But see Commonwealth v. Bacon, 411 N.E.2d 772 (Mass. 1980).
The officers stopped two young men driving a Cadillac at 4:10 A.M. Bacon, 411
N.E.2d at 773. When the young men observed the officers, one raised his hand as
if to hide his face. [d. The court held that "two youthful appearing men were
operating a relatively expensive (but four year old) motor vehicle at 4:10 AM. on
a Saturday morning on Washington Street in Boston does not alone warrant a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify a police investigatory
stop." Id. at 775 (footnotes omitted). The court went on to say that while conceal-
ing one's face may be a factor as to the reasonableness of a stop in some cases,
it did not give the officer's reasonable suspicion in this case. [d.
sea See Stste v. BoOO, 524 N.E.2d 489, 495 n.2 (Ohio 1988) (Wright, J., dis-
senting).
The following exchange took place between defense counsel and [Officer]
Mandzak:
"Q. SO that the best you can say is that you saw someone bend down;
am I correct?
"A At what point?
"Q. Wouldn't you say you saw him make this motion?
"A. Yes.
"Q. You don't know what his hands did, do you?
"A. It looked like he was putting something underneath the seat.
"Q. Were you able to see his hands?
"A. No.
"Q. SO you don't know if he made a hand movement or not, do you?
"A. I don't know what he did. It looked like he was putting something
under his seat.
"Q. You don't know that, do you?
"A. I was suspicious of it.
"Q. The best you could tell, all he could have been doing is bending down
and his hand not go below the seat?
"A. It is possible.
"Q. You don't know if his hand was even outstretched, do you?
~A. It looked like he was bending down.
"Q. You don't know if his hand was outstretched, do you?
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been the intent of the Court in Terry, but have become reality.
There was no drug deal in Bobo's car that night. The person
parked in the car with Bobowas a woman, and "[t]he facts in
this case indicate that, if anything, a romantic tryst, not a drug
deal or any other illegal activity, was occurring in the car."?"
While these facts resulted in imprisonment of a guilty man in
Bobo, similarly weak facts are responsible for the constant
seizures of countless innocent citizens whose only "crime" is
being poor, a minority, or in a high crime neighborhood. This
deplorable repercussion stems from the striking failures of Ter-
ry and its progeny.
CONCLUSION
The Terry Court said that while expanding police power by
recognizing investigative stops on less than probable cause, it
intended to harness that power and bring it under the reason-
ableness command of the Fourth Amendment. The effect, how-
ever, has been the expansion of policeauthority that has yet to
be tempered by the Fourth Amendment, especially in urban
locations where the courts tend to focus more on the location
than on the particular facts of the case. After more than thirty-
five years of experience with the Terry rules, it is time to rein-
troduce the Fourth Amendment on to the streets of America
and into the relationships that law enforcement officers have
with people on the streets and in other venues.?"
"A. How do you mean outstretched?
"Q. In this fashion, in front of him?
"A. I couldn't see his hands.
"Q. Could you see his arms?
"A. I saw the back part of his body.
"Q. Could you see his arm?
"A. No."
[d.
aca Bobo, 524 N.E.2d at 494-95 (Wright, J., dissenting); see id. at 495 n.3 (''The
female occupant testified that she and appellee went out to dinner and then they
parked on the street. It appears they were parked for more than an hour before
the police arrived. In addition, [OfficerJ Mandzak testified that when he looked
into the car, 'she lthe female occupant] was fastening her clothing .").
J04 The fact that the Amendment was designed as a limit on governmental
powers is a reality that has been lost on the Court. Compare Tracey Maclin, The
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201
,",'''t''~ ."+._.......,- ....." ...~ .....,..~:~-....,.... ... 4 ~. •
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There is a need to redefine the Fourth Amendment term
"seizure" by assuming that a person has been seized by a law
enforcement officer if the officer does not inform the subject at
the initiation of the encounter that the subject is free to disre-
gard the request/command. This approach involves abandoning
the fiction that the reasonable person when confronted by a
police officer feels free to walk away or refuse to cooperate.
People do not believe they can simply disregard a police re-
quest. That belief is the natural result of the manner in which
(1993) (arguing that the present Supreme Court "has ignored or distorted the
history of the Fourth Amendment" and that "the central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion") (footnotes omitted) with
Sundby, supra note 112.
Camara and Terry constituted innovative departures from a fourth
amendment mentality that had restricted the amendment's coverage in
the name of maintaining the warrant clause's rigorous protections. In this
sense the Court's willingness in Camara and Terry to face the unique
fourth amendment problems posed by government activities like housing
inspections and stop and frisks is admirable. Two decades later, however,
it has become evident that those decisions came at a price. The combined
effect of Camara and Terry is the major reason the Court has failed to
meet the first challenge of defining a rational relationship between the
warrant and reasonableness clauses that fulfills the amendment's purpos-
es.
. The Court in Camara and Terry embraced the reasonableness
balancing test in a manner that conceptually weakened probable cause
and failed to provide any long-term guidance or limits for the future role
of reasonableness.
Id. at 398-99; and Scott E. Sundby, "Eueryman'ts Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen, 94 COLUM.L. REV. 1751 (1994),
with Harris, supra note 81.
But it is also worth noting that Terry takes the law of search and
seizure as it applied to street encounters some distance back in the direc-
tion of pre-Mapp law, to the time that police officers ruled the streets on
simple gut instinct that told them whether a person was "dirty." If Mapp
meant officers could no longer ignore the Fourth Amendment because of
the newly-imposed requirement of probable cause, Terry returned a signifi-
cant portion of discretion to the police, increasing their power to interfere
with a citizen's "right of locomotion" and to conduct searches. To be sure,
Terry required that police have an articulable reason for their conduct,
rather than having total discretion. But the conclusion is inescapable that
in Terry the police won back a significant part of the power they needed
to conduct business according to pre-Mapp standards.
Id. at 985 (footnotes omitted).
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an officer's request is communicated, often cloaked in the form
of a command. There is only one way to assure that the reason-
able person would feel free to disregard the request/command
and that is to have the officer inform the subject of the
choice.P" Although the United States Supreme Court is loathe
to impose such requirements upon the police except in the most
"inherently coercive" situations, it is that Court's willingness to
engage in the fiction that has created the problem. The only
305 Compare Butterfloss, supra note 185, at 442 (proposing "that the
Mendenhall-Royer standard, as presently interpreted, should be discarded because
it is unworkable and fails to strike the appropriate balance between the liberty
interests of the citizen and the interest of the state in combating crime. The
test should be replaced by a per se rule ."), with Anderson, supra note 146,
{The only alternative way to fix the balance that has been tilted
heavily in favor of the police] may be to resort to locally heightened and
sanctioned police review. This will require citizens to carefully consider
policies and approaches that may be used to monitor the actions of local
police. The reliance on judicial controls has proven to be a mistake be-
cause such reliance is inefficient. That is not to say that sound jurispru-
dence that protects the rights of the accused is still not required, it sim-
ply cannot be relied on as the primary tool for enforcing police account-
ability.
Id. at 750; and Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amend-
ment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1994).
Finally, in considering what the (Fourth] amendment ought to mean,
we must afford legislators and administrators an opportunity to play their
role in Fourth Amendment decision making. Historically, legislators and
administrators have been minor players in search-and-seizure jurispru-
dence, but they have the potential to be the greatest heroes of the Fourth
Amendment's morality tale because they are best situated to protect the
people by regulating and controlling law enforcement officials- the actors
who most directly impact on citizens' Fourth Amendment interests. Should
legislators or administrators fail to live up to their potential, they can be
educated, prodded, or removed from office by the people.
By integrating juries, judges, legislators, and administrators into the
Fourth Amendment's decisionmaking structure, we stimulate the ideal of
participatory political decision making under our republican form of gov-
ernment. In the continuing struggle between individual autonomy and
collective security, we the people must "find a way to talk about an irrec-
oncilable clash of interests that does some real justice to claims on both
sides." This dialogue cannot be left to the organs of the state because the
judiciary is not us; the legislature is not us; the executive is not us. By
putting the people back into the Fourth Amendment via their participa-
tion in jury determination of search-and-seizure law, we empower the
people as an important force of social definition and cohesion.
[d. at 431.
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way to overcomethe present situation is to impose a require-
ment that absence such warning, there is a seizure of the per-
son which must meet the reasonableness standard.
There also is a need to reshape the reasonable suspicion
standard to elevate the suspect's conduct above ancillary fac-
tors. The locale of a stop, which is often a proxy for race,
should not be a substitute for suspicious behavior on the part
of the suspect. Moreover,the inferences that a court credits to
a trained law enforcement officer should be inferences drawn
from actual facts and suspiciousconduct,not inferences heaped
on top of inferences often originating, again, in race. Obviously,
reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause,
but it still demands a conclusiondrawn from actual conduct
instead of just race, location, and time of day, in other words,
not thin air. A more rigorous analysis of reasonable suspicion
requires only that the auxiliary factors-location, time of day,
and an officer's intuition-be treated as supplemental instead
of a substitute for facts and circumstances in the reasonable
suspicion equation.
